THE DEBATE ABOUT ARGUMENT AND SPIRIT OF AL-GAZĀLĪ’S AND IBN RUSHD’S AS WELL AS THE IMPLICATION ON ISLAMIC THOUGHTS

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Abstract: The decline of Islamic science is seen as impacts of al-Gazālī’s criticism to philosophy and controversy surrounding the thought of al-Gazālī and Ibn Rushd. During the Golden Age in the medieval period, Muslim scholars and philosophers had been the world references for science and technology development. They lost this legacy because they embraced orthodoxy rather than rationality. Al-Gazālī had written a book called Tahāfut al-Falāsifah (The Collapse or Inconsistence of the Philosophers) which criticised Islamic philosophers especially Ibn Sīnā and Al-Fārābī. Later after the death of al-Gazālī, Ibn Rushd wrote book tahāfut al-tahāfut which commented on al-Gazālī’s book Tahāfut al-falāsifah. It was arguing over Muslims should advance in science and technology in this modern era as it was evident during the Golden Age Islamic Era (the 7th up to the 13th centuries) whereby Muslims were the world references in science and technology development. However, after the period Muslims abandoned rationality and have remained so up to the present. This situation caused Islamic thoughts to move from rationality to orthodoxy. Al-Gazālī has been considered as the cause of the decline in Islamic Thought as he critiqued Islamic philosophers especially Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī in his book Tahāfut al-Falāsifah. Later Ibn Rushd wrote book Tahāfut al-Tahāfut which commented on al-Gazālī’s book Tahāfut al-Falāsifah.

Key Words: philosophy, Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, al-Gazālī, Ibn Rushd, Islamic knowledge, critique and debate.

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Introduction

Muslims had been the world references in the development of science and technology during the Islamic golden age in the medieval periods. There are some characteristics of this period: (1) many Islamic learning centers and libraries were built; (2) academic forum of scholars could be found in any corner of the city; (3) the scholars wrote many books from their findings and by translating from various languages such as India, Persia, Greece, Latin, Syriac, and Hebrew into Arabic. There were many books of the Greece and Alexandria philosophers and the philosophers from various learning centres who had best reputation translated into Arabic. This situation accelerated the development of philosophy, sciences, technology and the arts.¹

This situation was stark contrast with the development at the end of the 13th century up to the mid-15th century. Since then, Muslims had been in stagnancy and faced to a variety of issues within a large network which was difficult to break down. This problem affected all of science and technology, relationships between people and between countries, the field of the environment, security, and sustainability in the long run. Those problems appeared without limit².

Likewise, Islam as a religion practised by the majority of people in the world and Islamic countries have felt the impact of the decline of science and technology. Muslims were not able to catch up and stand equal with the other nations. Islamic educational institutions have lost creativity to bring Muslims into

¹Muhammad Taqi Mishbah Yazdi, Buku Daras Filsafat Islam (Jakarta: Mizan, 2003), 9 Contact with Mohammedans, in Spain and to lesser extent in Sicily, made the West aware of Aristoteles, also of Arabic numerals, algebra, and chemistry. It was this contact that began the revival of learning in the eleventh century, leading to the Scholastic philosophy. It was much later, from the thirteenth century onward, that the study of Greek enabled men to go direct to the work of Plato and Aristotle and other Greek writer of antiquity. But if the Arabs had not preserved the tradition, the men of Renaissance might not have suspected how much was to be gained by the revival of classical learning. Bertrand Russel, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), 283.

progress and equality in science. The stagnancy of *ijtiḥad* in Islam and rationalism has framed Muslims’ mindset until today. They have not been able to respond to the situation and condition of the world which is increasingly changing, along with the way with science paradigm.\(^3\)

If we look at the reality of the history of Islamic civilisation, the medieval values and spirit of progress and creativity that came up with the spirit of the Qur’ān have positioned science in Islam to achieve impressive progress. This situation sparked the emergence of creative people like al-Kindī, al-Rāzī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sinān, Ibn Sinā (Avicenna), al-Mas′ūdī, al-Ṭabarī, al-Gazālī, Nāṣir Khusraw, and ‘Umar Khayyām. These Islamic scholars had been outstanding figures with different majors such as medical science, mathematics, geography, history, and others.\(^4\)

Why did creative science die out in Islamic civilisation? This began at the end of the 15\(^{th}\) century and was started when devastation of Mongol invasion. The demise of natural science in Islamic nations had started much earlier. First was very much due to many internal causes, that is the turning inward and the isolation of our scientific enterprise and second was the main of active discouragement to innovation (*taqlid*). The later parts of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries in Islam (when this decline began) were periods of intense politically motivated, sectarian and religious strife. Even Imām al-Gazālī\(^5\) said: “a man

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\(^5\)Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Gazālī was born at Tus in Persia in 450 A.H. (1058 A.D). His father died when he was quite young, but the guardian saw to it that this lad o’ parts and his brother received a good education. After the young al-Gazālī had spent some years of study under the greatest theologian of the age, al-Juwaynī, Imām al-Haramayn, his outstanding intellectual gifts were noted by Nizām al-Mulk, the all powerful vizier of the Turkish sultan who ruled the ‘Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad, and he appointed him professor at the university he had founded in the capital. Thus at the age of thirty-three he had attained to one of the most distinguished positions in the academic world of his day. William W. Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al-Gazālī* (USA: Oxford, 2000), 9.
who imagines Islam is defended by the denial of the mathematics sciences has committed a grievous crime indeed against religion”. There is nothing in these sciences opposed to the truth of the religion; the temper of the age had turned away from creative science, to Sūfīsm either with its profane or to a rigid orthodoxy with a lack of tolerance (taqlid) for innovation (ijtihad), in all fields of learning also including the sciences. In addition, Islamic law sourced from the thoughts of earlier scholars were considered. This led to the understanding of science dichotomy in Islam. The presumption that resulted from a stagnation of thought in Islam, a philosophy that has led to rational thought that deliver the progress is no longer an important part of Islamic thought.

This situation happened after al-Gazālī (1058-1111 CE) criticised and questioned the philosophers in his book, “The Incoherence of the Philosopher” (Tabāṣūt al-Falāṣifah). He criticised the claim that Aristotelian peripateticism was the foundation of Islamic philosophy. Avicenna (980-1037 CE) and al-Fārābī (257 H / 870 CE) were two Muslims philosophers who became the object of criticism of al-Gazālī and considered to have a lot of mistakes in the logic of metaphysical thinking (divinity).

Al-Gazālī’s critique arouse the assumption that he had ended the history of philosophy in the Islamic world. Oliver Leaman argues that Al-Gazālī tried to provide a “brake control” with which philosophers did not use their philosophical-ratio freely. It was meant to be an example to educate the philosophers for intellectual debate. The conservative ‘ulamā’ who did not like philosophy then made al-Gazālī’s argument as a basis for reducing the power of philosophy.

After al-Gazālī, Ibn Rushd (1126-1198 AD), criticised the views of al-Gazālī in his book Tabāṣūt al-Tabāṣūt, containing 1006

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6Muhammad Abdus Salam, Renaissance of Sciences In Islamic Countries (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 1926), 98.
pages. Ibn Rushd applied intellectual-rational philosophical approach, which was adopted by the West later as a path to enlightenment. Rationality aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy culminated in Ibn Rushd. Ibn Rushd criticised al-Gazālī and tried to purify philosophy. He was recognised as a pupil of Aristotle purest among Muslim philosophers. His main contribution to the Ibn Rushd Islamic philosophy is, first, his thesis about the various paths to reach the same truth. All lanes are used equally acceptable, and based on the theory of meaning are very rational and rich ideas.  

He wrote many commentaries of differing length on his works. Ibn Rushd was not only a philosopher but also a judge, legal thinker, physician, and politician, like so many of the other philosophers in the Islamic world. His work marked by its commitment to what he took to be pure Aristotelian and his relative antipathy to Neo-Platonism. He defended the acceptability of philosophy in the Islamic world, arguing that it does not contradict religion but complements it. Ibn Rushd held that philosophy represents the system of demonstrative or rational argumentation, while religion presents the conclusions of philosophy to a wider audience in a form that enables the latter to understand how to act. Ibn Rushd, who believed in what we may call the party of truth, both philosophical and religious, was convinced that these differences were, indeed, reconcilable, if, as a first step, we were to comply with the Qur’an injunction in Surah 3, 5–6, to discriminate clearly between those verses described as ‘sound’ (muḥkam) and those described as ‘ambiguous’ (mutashābih).  

In much secondary literatures on Islam and science written in the West, Al-Gazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tabājīt al-falāṣīf) is often held as the main culprit for the decline of science in Islamic civilisation. It is, therefore, interesting to read Ibn Rushd’s response to this work, which

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9Ibid., 8–9.
first quotes Al-Gazālī’s arguments and then responds to it. In a way, this can be seen as a debate between two of the greatest minds in Islamic tradition, Al-Gazālī and Ibn Rushd. It is interesting to note that Al-Gazālī’s work tackles twenty issues. The main charge against Al-Gazālī is that he destroyed science in Islamic civilisation by destroying causal relations. As what can be seen from the following except, al-Gazālī is, in fact, advocating an occasionalist view. He does so to preserve the Islamic view of miracles. The debate is, therefore, not really about science per se, but on the limits of rational inquiry into meta-scientific matters. 12

There are some papers about al-Gazālī and Ibn Rushd written by scholars. Munawar Haque wrote about Impact of the Controversy between al-Gazālī and Ibn Rushd on the Development of Islamic Thought. The study concludes that both al-Gazālī and Ibn Rushd have essentially contributed to the growth of intellectualism in Islam. 13 Raja Bahlul wrote Ghazali on the Creation vs. Eternity of the World. This paper purpose will be to argue that: firstly, Ghazali’s argument and his reputation are based on incompatible views of time, and cannot, therefore, both be maintained. Secondly, Ghazali fails to establish the one interesting premise which he employs in his argument from creation 14 Josep Luig Motada, Ibn Rushd Versus al-Gazālī: Reconsideration of Polemik, the study conclude that philosophy in the Islamic tradition continued to advance through the work of al-Gazālī and Ibn Rushd in the recognized manner of polemic, even if did not seem to be aware that he


himself was engaged in philosophy. Al-Gazālī ultimate personal concern was always other than philosophy, kalam or even Sūfism—for the true nature of religious knowledge cannot be identified with any one of these disciplines of knowing.15

Different from the paper above, this paper described about how the Niẓām al-Mulk government affected Al-Gazālī thought and Muwahḥidīn government affected Ibn Rushd’s thought too. That paper above does not describe the background of debate between al-Gazālī and Ibn Rushd. Although Munawar Haque explained impact contributed to the growth of intellectualism in Islam, but this paper described the Islamic scholars (‘ulamā’) interpretation to the al-Gazālī’s thought caused of Islam decline.

**Background of the Debate Between al-Gazālī and Ibn Rushd**

In the eleventh century A.D., there was a great deterioration in Muslims’ belief and observance of the shari’a as results of the influence of Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sinā’s Neo-Platonist philosophy, of Shi’a Battiness, of false Sūfis and of evil religious scholars. It was at this time of laxity in beliefs and practices that Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muhammad al-Gazālī (d. 505/1111) flourished as a renewed (mujaddid) of the religion of Islam and as one of the greatest intellectual in Islamic history. Well versed in almost all major intellectual disciplines of the time, al-Gazālī refuted the prevailing false beliefs completely and fully exposed the wrongness of existing practices. As substitutes for these, he presented a belief system following the Qur’an and tradition, jurisprudence, Sūfism and his own thoughts and experiences. This system of practices may be called al-Gazālī theory of Islamic guidance, an aspect of which is set forth in the present work.16

He wrote several books on logic and law. It was also during this period that he wrote his famous refutation of the controversial doctrinal beliefs held by Muslim philosophers

about the eternity of the world. Their rejection of corporeal resurrection and that God only knew universals. The incoherence of the philosophers (*Tabāfut al-falāsifah*) followed by a vitriolic exposure of the doctrines of the Ismā‘īliyya Shia called the obscenities of the esoteric (*Fadā'ib al-batiniyya*). However, his meteoric rise came to an abrupt and dramatic end when he experienced a debilitating spiritual crisis, which he described in some detail in his spiritual testimony, *Deliverance from error* (*al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*). He decided to abandon his public life of teaching and embarked on a life of contemplative reflection and asceticism. Explanations abound for this dramatic turn in Ghazali life. Some argue that he suffered intellectual self-doubt in his engagement with philosophy. Others link his anxieties to the series of Ismā‘īliyya assassinations targeting political and religious figures, which gave al-Ghazālī cause to fear for his own life. There is also a view that he found his political alliances with the Seljuk rulers and his ties to the Abbasid caliph’s palace to be a source of moral suffocation. Perhaps cumulatively all these pressures had a deleterious impact on his mind and soul.\(^\text{17}\)

That Situation most chaotic period in the history of Islam.\(^\text{18}\) A single Caliphate are split asunder into a State system that was

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\(^{17}\)Martin (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 275.

\(^{18}\)We saw above, the various *madhāhib* at times served as focal points for intense rivalries between different groups of Muslims, rivalries, which may have been grounded in interests and issues that had little to do with juristic questions. The city of Nishapur, for example, convulsed in the early Middle Period by civic disturbances pitting “Hanafis” against “Shafi‘is,” where it is possible that the *madhhab* labels served as a screen for underlying social competition or even theological disagreements. Under Saljuq rule more generally, and especially in Baghdad, the various *madhāhib* became associated with particular political factions and interests. The sultans Toghril Beg and Alp Arslan, for example, patronized the Hanafi School, appointing Hanafi scholars as *qāḍī’s* and preachers. On the other hand, the Saljuqs’ Persian vizier Nizām al-Mulk cultivated the Shafi‘is, including the famous scholars Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī and Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī (d.1083), particularly in the *madrasas* which he built and endowed for them in Baghdad and elsewhere. It is tempting to trace the rivalry between Shafi‘is and Hanafis to underlying differences in their juristic orientation, in particular the Shafi‘i emphasis on upon tradition, expressed in their privileging of hadith reports, against a greater willingness on the part of Hanafis to sanction the use of human...
decentralised and compete who are United only by the Abbasid Caliph which is symbolic, but not helpless, in Baghdad. The day Ismā‘iliyya actively affect the Sunni followers of belief. Muslim philosophers who greatly indebted on Hellenism and Neoplatonism were offering alternative answers sometimes compete, the questions of philosophical and theological often harass and test the relationship between reason and faith. Sūfism is the movement of time with strong emotional components and eclectic with a tendency to accept practices takbāyyul. Most of what happened seemed out of reach and the scholars, who control much of the feeling that these movements threaten their status and authority in the Congregation. In the midst of the chaos, al-Gazālī appeared, as did al-Shafi‘i in several centuries earlier, to rescue his day by giving the necessary religious synthesis. A remarkable success might be in the measure of a title given to him as a Muslim reformer (Mujaddid)19.

Background criticism of al-Gazālī in philosophy is also caused by the political situation at the moment is rebellion against Mu‘tazila Ash‘arī the uprising under the leadership of Niẓām al-Mulk who became minister Daulah Saljukiyah minister who replaced Abū Maṣūr Muḥammad al-Kindārī, Ash‘arite experienced mihnaḥ, culminating so penetrated all corners, so to Khurasan Sham, Hijas and Iraq they are oppressed, prevented from studying and preaching to the community leaders were arrested20.

The position of al-Gazālī among theologians, Batinites, philosophers and Sūfis increasingly visible when the state, reason in jurisprudential argument. There are also some indications that the growing appeal of Islamic mysticism was a factor bubbling under the surface of the madhhab differences, as very few Hanafi jurists in the early Middle Period identified as having been associated with Sufism. On the other hand, it is also clear that madhhab rivalry transcended any intellectual differences, and became enmeshed in a complex web of social and political competition. Jonathan P. Berkley, The Formation of Islam, Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 217.


namely the Caliph al-Mustaẓharī asked him to write a book against the Ismā‘īlī movement Batinites group "al-ta‘miliyah" headed by Hasan al-Shabah. As noted al-Gazālī himself is the government of al-Mustaẓharī noble who ordered him to write a book in order to oppose Batinites group. To reject batinites groups, namely philosophy Ismā‘īliyyah not only obliges studied this philosophy, even a philosophy as a whole, and then going against the philosophers given the close connection between Ismā‘īlī philosophy Greek philosophy such as Ibn Sīnā noted. And if we look from the other side that the methods of the early leaders (ṭārīqah al-mutaqaddimin) in science teologi deadlocked after al-Bāqillānī and Abū al-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī, teacher al-Gazālī confirmed later scholars’ method (ṭārīqah al-muta‘akbirin) who left the model analogical argument between the transcendent world with the world of the senses (istiḍālā bi al-mortir ‘alā al-gayb) and instead later adopted the Aristotelian qiyas, we can understand the extent of al-Gazālī needs to qiyas Aristotelian logic and against it own. He needed to confirm the faith Asy'ariyah Mu’tazila opposite to that in his method still cling to the analogical argument between the transcendent world with the world of the senses (istiḍālā bi al-shabīd al-gayb) and he is needed again when going against al-ta‘limiyyah were left thinking qiyās and say necessity to acquire knowledge from a teacher (navigator) and the last she needed to explain the chaos of philosophy itself21.

Al-Gazālī was of the Shafi and the state of the shelter also Shafi‘iyah likewise “mibnah al-kubrā” committed against Mu'tazila and Hanafiyah time too close together. Therefore, it is not surprising that Tabāṣīf al-Falāṣīfah against Ibn Sīnā and Al-Fārābī because both are at odds with the doctrine Asy'ariyah.

Different with Ibn Rushd,22 at the time of Abū Yūṣuf Ya‘qūb ibn ‘Abdul believer founders of the dynasty caliph

21Ibid., 420.

22Abū al-Wālid Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd (Aven Rushd, which became Averroes for the Latins) was born at Córdoba in 520/1126. His grandfather and father had been famous jurists, invested with the dignity of supreme judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt), and influential political personages. The young Averroes received a complete education: theology
Muwaḥḥidin is fond of philosophy. All resources stated that the Caliph Abū Ya‘qūb, the father of al-Mansūr very packed, philosophy, he ordered to collect and look for books on philosophy all over the Maghreb and Andalusia. Many of the costs he had to spend in an effort to get books of philosophy so that he has a large collection of library philosophy similar to that owned by the library of al-Ḥakam al-Mustansir and al-Ma‘mūn al-Abbāsī. Associated with the Abū Ya‘qūb predilection to philosophy, be some source of information stating that a personal doctor who is also a great philosopher, Ibn Tufayl once said to Ibn Rushd: I heard the Commander of the Believers (Abū Ya‘qūb) complain about the difficulty to understand the statements of Aristotle and also language translators, also complained about the complexity of the intent of the thoughts of Aristotle. He also said that “if there are people willing to make brief comments and explanations members’ contents of Aristotle's book after the first he really understands it, the person must have encouraged others better understand the contents.

Therefore, when it is Ibn Tufayl was too busy and had to enter advanced age, he suggested his friend, Ibn Rushd, to do a very important thing, and then he proposed to Abū Ya‘qūb. Ibn Rushd, Abū Ya‘qūb then perform a series of discussions on issues of philosophy. Ibn Rushd accepts the offer, he then made a comment (talkhīṣ) books of Aristotle. Quick comment is meant

and law (fiqh), poetry, medicine, mathematics, astronomy and philosophy. In 548/1153, he went to Morocco, and in 565/1169-1170, he was qādī of Seville. The same year saw the completion of his Commentary on the Treatise on Animals and his Lesser Commentary on Physics. This was an immensely productive period of his life. In 570/1174, he completed his Lesser Commentaries on Rhetoric and Metaphysics, and became seriously ill. When he had recovered, he set out again on the journeys enjoined by his profession. In 574/1178, he was in Morocco—this was the year in which he wrote the treatise that translated into Latin with the title De substantia orbis. In 578/1182 the Muwaḥḥid sovereign Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf, to whom he had been presented by Ibn Tufayl, appointed him as his physician, and then conferred on him the dignity of Qāḍī of Cordoba. Averroes enjoyed the same favour at the hands of the sovereign's successor, Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb al-Ma’ṣūr. Henri Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy (London: Kegan Paul International, 1962), 242.
by Ibn Rushd is the same as that by the orientalists called “comment”. Ibn Rushd before concentrating on writing Jawāmi‘ (conclusions) concerning ʿmāṭiṣiq (formal logic). Jawāmi‘ is a summary of the book sort of diktat or textbooks that exist today. In addition, he also wrote Fashl al maqal which contains an explanation of keharus studied philosophy in view of the shari‘ah. Also, his book al-kashf an Manābil al-ʿAdillah fi al-Millah Aqāʿid specifications that are analysing and criticising Ashari sect, as well as offer alternative closer to the ruh (spirit) and the objectives of sharia as he said himself. Then his famous book Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, which contains a refutation of al-Gazālī by filing arguments that broke the arguments and allegations of Al-Gazālī against the philosophers, also about the lack of ability of Ibn Sīnā to make changes various problems of philosophers as offered Aristotlec23.

Pervez Hoodbhoy physicist of Massachusetts Institute of Technology commented the Ash‘ari theology as one of the causes of the science decline in Islam. According to him, this theological doctrine makes Muslims fatalistic, unrational and stagnant in confronting the phenomenon and reality. Furthermore, Hoodbhoy accused the Imām al-Gazālī as the person who destroyed a building of science in the Islamic world24.

The first accusation can be justified if Ash'arism is synonymous or equivalent to fatalism. However, equate and reduce the creed Ash'a'ira be Jabbariyah is wrong. More astray if Islam compared with fatalism. Similarly, the second accusation, which attacked and destroyed by Imām al-Gazālī is not really a science building, but the scientific attitude. Science exalted such as religion, so that should be unquestionable and not be sued its truth. Knowledge like this criticised by Imām al-Gazālī, and not science itself. So, the title of his work is Tahāfut al-Falāsifah not Tahāfut al-Falsafah. If read carefully and thoroughly, criticism Imām al-Gazālī precisely is positive for the development and

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progress of knowledge. In it scattered the seeds of empiricism that would become the hallmark of modern science

**The Debate Issues Between al-Gazālī and Ibn Rushd**

In *Tabāṣfut al-Falāṣifah*, there are 20, which published which philosophers have deliberated deviate from the truth. Three issues were considered severe and for the adherents labelled infidels. Of these questions, three of them singled out by him as particularly pernicious from a religious (Islamic) point of view: the eternity of the world, the denial of God’s knowledge of particulars and the denial of the resurrection of the body. On these three questions, the Muslim philosophers, with al-Fārābī and Ibn Sinā at their head, should be declared infidels (*takfīr*), according to him. On the remaining seventeen propositions, those philosophers should be declared heretics or innovators (*tabdīʔ*) only. These less pernicious questions, in the opinion of al-Gazālī, include the post-eternity of the world (*abādiyah*), a corollary of pre-eternity (*qidam*) and the inability of the philosophers to prove the existence of God, as Creator of the world, since they believed it to be eternal and therefore requiring no creator. Thus, when the philosophers speak of God as Creator of the world, al-Gazālī charges, they simply engage in dissimulation or double-talk (*talbis*).

The first major criticism is the eternity of the world. This is a debate about the creation of which is disputed by Muslim philosopher, especially theologians (*mutakallimun*) and philosopher (*falāṣifah*). In philosopher knowledge. God described in various ways, such as light. If God described like to light or even more clearly as the sun and the universe as a beam of light. Then the question is the shining light of the sun based on the free will of the sun or a necessity? If we go back to the theory of emanation- Peripatetic philosopher, especially al-

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Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, believe that God only thinks of precious, i.e. Himself and He does not think the other. Thus clear that, for the philosophers above, the universe is emitted from God’s reasoned action (emanating from God), not the desire of God, but as a logical necessity. Whenever, God’s reason action, so, there is something that emanates light from God, determined or unplanned.

In *Tabāṣjat al-Falāsifah* al-Gazālī argument why the criticism philosopher about the eternity of the world. Philosophers in Al-Gazālī’s view claimed that is impossible something created for the first time was rise from the eternity (*azali*). For example, if we assume something in the eternity when the nature unknown, so the lack of nature in the first time without determining factor (*murajjih*) to enable it. In fact, the lack of nature is a possibility. If the nature after created, we faced with two alternatives. The prime of determinant that had created the universe or not to created. If it does not encourage the creation of nature, so the nature will be only remain a mere possibility, as before. If it does inspire to the created of nature, then who created the determining factor? Why He rises in the same time with the creation of nature, not rise before? Therefore, problem of determinant factor rise is a problem on its self.

In terms of causality, al-Gazālī holds that every time fire burns cotton, the fire itself does not produce the burning effects; they are caused directly by God. It is in God’s power to stop the fire from producing these habitual effects, if and when He so wishes. This accounts for the presence of miracles. Ibn Rushd responds by pointing out that a denial of direct causation would destroy the fixed natures. If fire no longer has the causal power of burning, then there is nothing to distinguish it from other things such as water or earth. Consequently, we can no longer differentiate one thing from another in any real sense. This amounts to a destruction of peculiar and distinctive nature of individual substances and hence we can no longer have any

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real knowledge of the natural world. Thus, the removal of the cause-and-effect relationship leads to the removal of the possibility of knowledge of nature\textsuperscript{29}. They argued that the hadiths is no escaping the eternal (\textit{qadīm}) and therefore conceivable solitude eternal (\textit{qadīm}) that during this nature do not be existent. Such situations may not arise, because reason cannot imagine the vacuum (\textit{muddah al-tark}) finite period until the created universe. If to say \textit{muddah al-tark} ever existed and limited, so God also predetermined and impossible.\textsuperscript{30}

With \textit{Mishkāh al-Anwār}, however, that al-Gazālī follows Ibn Sīnā’s epistemological model most closely. The table below shows a level of correspondence between Ibn Sīnā’s and Al-Gazālī’s categories indicating significant influence. In this table, the first references to Ibn Sīnā’s terms drawn from \textit{Ishārāt}, the second from \textit{Ithbāt}. Al-Gazālī’s terminology will be explained next the table\textsuperscript{31}.

Table: A comparison of Ibn Sīnā’s and Al-Gazālī’s interpretations of Q24:35

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ishārāt/Ithbāt</th>
<th>Mishkāh al-Anwār</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘\textit{aql} hayyulānī/\textit{aql} al-hayyulānī}</td>
<td>Niche \textit{al-rūb al-hassas}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘\textit{aql} bi al-fi’l/\textit{aql} al-mustafād bi al-fi’l}</td>
<td>Lamp \textit{al-rūb al-‘aqli}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘\textit{aql} bi al-malaka/that which mediates}</td>
<td>Glass \textit{al-rūb al-khayyālī}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Al-Gazālī begins by summarizing how God can be reasonable as pure existence. Would God have an essence—quiddity—His existence coupled with this and would thus ensue it, would be it necessarily. It would thus be an effect and this would make the necessary existence an effect, which is a


\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., 88.

\textsuperscript{31}See Martin Whittingham, \textit{Al-Gazālī and the Qur’an: One Book, Many Meanings} (London: Routledge, 2007), 10.
contradiction parse. The reason for the confusion al-Gazālī sees in the expression “necessary existence”. He himself assumes that God has reality and essence. He exists as reality, which means His existence linked with His reality. Existence can only understand as (necessary) effect, without letting a problem accrue, if it has specified at the same time that this existence is eternal and does not depend on an initiating agent or antecedent origin. Is the admitted original no inconsistency arises, since this can only consist in an endless regress of causes, which in this way avoided? The end of this chain is, according to al-Gazālī, the existing reality of God and a concrete essence is in consequence possible. The dispute only subsists due to the designation or differing interpretations of the position of existence. The only proven impossibility is a (reflexively) perpetual chain of causes.  

Equally, pernicious and gratuitous, al-Gazālī goes on to argue, is the whole emanation scheme, which, as we have seen, formed the cornerstone of the metaphysics and cosmology of al-Fārābī and other Muslim Neo-Platonists. This scheme rests on the arbitrary premise that out of the One, only one can come, which they then proceed to interpret in a variety of preposterous ways, which, ‘were one to refer to a dream he saw in his sleep, he would be thought to suffer from a foul humor’. The philosophers then go on to show, al-Gazālī add, that the One has no knowledge of the world. He has created, robbing Him thereby of the attributes of life, knowledge and will and reducing Him to the status of the dead. An equally devastating attack launched against the philosophers’ thesis that the correlation between causes and effects is necessary and irreversible. For al-Gazālī, neither reason nor observation confirms this thesis, which is rooted in the habitual observation of that correlation, which is far from being necessary. God, as the Sole Agent in the

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universe, can always bring about its suspension, as happens in miracles, with the possibility of which all Muslims concur. To that argument above, Ibn Rushd has said: “God created come through with desire, as the theologian’s argument has a problem”. For example, if nature created through the God desires, then the question is when does the desire of God have, since period long-established (azali) or future? That since period long established, then the universe has preexists, with God. However, it certainly rejected by theologians, because it will result in the eternity of the world. However, when desires it expose later, after He did not have a desire, then that desire lead to other essential issues. For example, the change from “God doesn’t have the desire” to “have the desire to create”, it cannot happen just like that, without any acceptable reason (murajjih) for this change is coming from the outside, but it was impossible because there is nothing else at that moment except God alone. Therefore, it stated that the nature created through the desire of God will bring serious problems in philosophical thought. Therefore, philosophers chose the second alternative, i.e. The universe created as a logical necessity and not by the God desire.

Ibn Rushd’s strategy in rebutting al-Gazālī’s opinions is spelt out in his fasl al-maqal, written in 1180, possibly before al-tabāhifūt, written in the same year. Here, he explains that the conflict between the philosophers and the theologians is purely verbal or semantic. For if we take the eternity of the world as an example, we will find that of the three categories of entities on which the conflict revolves, i.e. God, particular objects and the universe as a whole, both sides is in agreement regarding the status of the first and second, only disagreeing on the status of the third. Yet their disagreement is not so radical as to justify the charge of infidelity (kufr) leveled at the philosophers. For if we examine the thesis of Aristotle and his Muslim followers, we will find that, unlike God, the universe is not said by them to be eternal in the real sense, since this would entail that, like God, it is uncaused, which the philosophers deny. Nor is it temporal

33 Fakhri, Al-Fārābī Founder, 136.
34 Kertanegara, Gerbang Kearifan, 96.
(muḥdathī) in the real sense, for then it would be corruptible (fāsidī). Ibn Rushd finds confirmation of this view in the Qur’ān itself, which states in Surah 11, 7, that ‘He created the heavens and the earth while His Throne was upon the water.’ This verse implies that the Throne, the water and the time that measures their duration are eternal.\textsuperscript{35}

Likewise, Qur’ān 41, 10, which states that God, having created the world in six days, ‘arose into heaven, which consisted of smoke’, implies that the heavens were created from smoke. Accordingly, in neither case can the eternity of the world or creation out of nothing be said to be asserted in the Qur’ān in an ‘unambiguous’ way, as the theologians, including al-Gazālī, actually claim. They are instead open to interpretation. This interpretation, as already mentioned, is the business of the philosophers alone, because they alone are able to apply the method of logical demonstration (burḥān) unlike the theologians and the masses at large, who are only able to apply the inferior methods of dialectic (jadāl) or rhetoric (khatābah) respectively.\textsuperscript{36}

God had created the world in time by an act of ‘eternal will’, as al-Gazālī explicitly stated in his Tabāfut. For Ibn Rushd, the concept of an eternal will causing the world to come into being in time is self-contradictory: it presupposes an infinite lapse of time, during which God was idle, and confuses two fundamental concepts, namely willing and doing (fi‘l), which are entirely different. Now, the universe, whether eternal or temporal, is clearly the product of God’s ‘doing’ which, in view of His omnipotence, does not allow for the least lapse or interval between the act of doing and the actual production of its object, in this case the world, which comes into being instantly at the behest of God. Therefore, Ibn Rushd argues, God cannot create the world in time unless He is in time, which the theologians themselves reject.\textsuperscript{37}

According to al-Gazālī, this statement showed the philosopher impious. Otherwise, the truth is no grain particular in heaven or on earth escaped from God knowledge. The

\textsuperscript{35}Fakhry, \textit{Islamic Philosophy}, 96.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., 97.
opinion is based on the al-Qur’an, a conceived textual includes the following: (QS [34]:2), (QS [10]:6), (QS [50]:16), (QS [35]:11), (QS [6]:59), (QS [4]:166) and others.38

Against the accusation, Ibn Rushd answer, that al-Gazālī has made mistakes in assessing the peripatetic philosopher (ḥukamā’ al-mashā’īn) in the matter above, whereas the philosophers argued that God knows particular (juṣ’iyyah) with the knowledge that not similar to our knowledge. Our knowledge about particular (juṣ’iyyah) is effect (ma’lul) of the object of knowledge, created in conjunction with the creation of the object of knowledge itself. God’s knowledge that exists is the opposite. God’s of knowledge is the caused (Allah) for an object exist. Whoever is likened to two forms of knowledge to another, he has to unite the essence of things but is mutually contradictory. A view like that for Ibn Rushd is foolishness39.

The third major criticism levelled by al-Gazālī was the philosophers’ denial of bodily resurrection. Here Ibn Rushd is content to give a ‘methodological’ answer. ‘Resurrection’, he writes, ‘has been affirmed by the religious laws (shar’ī) and has been proven demonstratively by the philosophers. Those philosophers are unanimous that humankind should comply with the religious teachings and precepts enunciated by the prophets, as far as they prescribe virtuous actions and pious observances. Resurrection, with which the prospects of punishment and reward bound up, is unquestionably one of those commendable precepts. The only difference between the philosophers and the theologians on this score is that the ‘mode’ of resurrection favoured by each group is different; the philosophers for their part favours ‘spiritual resurrection (ma‘ād rūhānī)’, whereas the theologians favours bodily resurrection. With respect to the fact of resurrection, both groups agree. The Qur’an itself has ‘represented’ in sensuous images the mode of resurrection and the punishments and rewards awaiting humankind in the Hereafter, in order to make them more readily

intelligible to the masses who, unlike the philosophers, cannot comprehend abstract, spiritual language\textsuperscript{40}.

In this verse, Ibn Rushd observes, God equates death with sleep as regards the annihilation of the soul’s activity, now, since as we know, the soul is not dissolved in sleep, it therefore follows that it is necessarily not dissolved at death, in both cases then, it is the organ and not the soul itself that cases. Here again, Ibn Rushd taxes with infidelity for setting down allegorical interpretations in popular writing, regardless of his good intention of educating people, for in fact, the opposite the result. Anyone of interpretative class, say Ibn Rushd, “who disclose such an interpretation to him (someone who is not qualified for it) is summoning him to unbelief, and he who summons to unbelief is unbeliever.”\textsuperscript{41}

**Implication of Debate In Islamic Thought**

The al-Gazālī critique of philosophy make stronger Ash‘arism and inspire successive thinkers, such as Ibn Taymiyya (1274-1328 AD), and Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1983 AD). They are trying to free Islamic philosophy from the shackles of Greek philosophy, especially Aristotelians. Then Ash‘arism give the impression as a barrier to the growth of freedom, thought in Islam that has been initiated by fanatics of Aristotelian’s. Finally, Aristotelian’s power to obstruct the development of Islamic thought emerged from various circles, and not just from the Ash‘arisme. Ibn Taymiyya for example, as a follower of the salaf sect called the philosophy as takhâyyl and heresy that will only damage Islam. That’s why he wrote many books attacking philosophy written in the book a *Radd alâ Manṭiqiyyin*, *Bayân Muwâfaqât, Naqd alâ Manṭiq*, *al-Radd alâ falsafah Ibn Rushd* and *Kitâb al-‘Aql wa al-Naqıl*. Theologian’s criticism to Aristotelians above to purify the faith.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{41}Isya A. Bello, *The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between Philosophy and Orthodoxy* (Netherlands: E.J.Brill, 1989), 81.
According to Nāsr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, *Tabāfut* has paralyzed rationalistic philosophy and kill careers philosophy as a discipline distinct from gnosia and theology of Islam throughout the Arab world. In *Jawābir al-Qur'an* (the jewels of the Qur'an), he tells us that *Tabāfut* is a masterpiece in theology for rejecting apostasy and heresy, dispel doubts and maintain religious beliefs laymen of doubts created by heretical. Long before al-Gazālī wrote *Tabāfut*, he embraces the Sūfī doctrine that “the light of intuition” (*kashf*) is superior to the intellect. Now, after a deep study of his philosophy, he accused the philosophers claim the ability to understand everything by reason alone, contradicts not only the theological claim that sense subject to the Sūfī faith but also claims that *kashf* is the key to confidence.43

Al-Gazālī thus confronted the problem of knowledge and of personal certitude fully. However, was he alone, among all the Muslim thinkers, in searching for experiential certainty in inner knowledge? This is an essential theme in al-Suhrawardī, who seems to have known almost nothing at all about al-Gazālī, and Avicenna and Abū al-Barakat had already faced the problem of self-awareness and its implications. As for knowledge of the heart, it formulated admirably, as we now know, by the Imāms of Shiism. Yet what makes this quest of al-Gazālī so moving is the drama into which it precipitated his life. When he speaks about true knowledge, what he says rings with the authenticity of personal testimony? In *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl* ("The Preservation from Error") al-Gazālī’s argument say: "True knowledge is the knowledge through which the known object is utterly disclosed (to the spirit), in such a manner that no doubt can exist with regard to it, and no error can tarnish it. It is the level at which the heart cannot admit or even conceive of doubt."44 In *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah* al-Gazālī said that philosophers believe that this natural *Qadim* which means no beginning. Meanwhile, according to him and according mutakallimin, this universe was created from nothing (ex nihilo critio) 45.

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44Corbin, *History of Islamic*, 181.
The emergence of al-Gazālī (w.1111 M) with the synthesis of Sūfism and Kalam had been hit with a hard soul existing scholastic theology so as to provide a spiritual foundation for moral practical in Islam. But the balance is very fragile and can only be maintained within the confines of a strict moral ethos. By other terms, the concept that the filing is unable to provide a solid framework for the creation of a single building which intellectual and comprehensive, which can lay theology are in an organic relationship with other disciplines, especially jurisprudence.\(^{46}\)

As evidence of the weakness of the concept offered Al-Gazālī is very limited regarding the relationship between theology and jurisprudence. As explained by al-Gazālī principles to be built by kalam, at least that have relevance to the fiqh limited only to the principles of God’s existence to its properties the All-knowing, a Will, The Talking or rule, and the dealing with the problem of prophet. These principles have Ghazali because fiqh need God's reign, which communicates the commands through the prophet. The rest, no more theological concepts that have relevance to the jurisprudence and dealing with the problem of prophet.\(^{47}\)

The period before al-Gazālī is regarded as one of the great periods in the history of Islam, but al-Gazālī see it as a period of decline in religious sciences. No obedience in practicing religion and the application of the law, but all jurists, theologians and narrators, all schools, books and religious debates just pay attention to outward things, seeing all this, he said that too much attention to outward things only creates depth inner mongering and broken, while the reality of sharia, what he calls the afterlife Jurisprudence (fiqh e hereafter) have been ignored altogether. Seeing bad symptoms of this, Ghazali is trying to exhale back the breath of life into his empty shell religious sciences of Islam after he felt the uncertainty of this, or another example, in terms of downsizing / enrichment metaphor Soroush, Ghazali saw a need for Islamic reform through maintenance parts have been

\(^{46}\)Abdul A’la, *Dari Neo Modernisme Ke Islam Liberal* (Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 2009), 77.

\(^{47}\)Ibid.
abandoned and neglected. One specific way that he chose for doing this is to restore the religious meaning terminologies outstanding during the first century of Islam. Soroush explicitly mentions the efforts of al-Gazālī on the first volume of Ihya’ as fiqh or tafaqquh which initially implies understanding and religious inquiry which is much broader than simply dealing with things that are halal and haram\textsuperscript{48}.

After al-Gazālī, Fazlur Rahman saw systematic theology of Islam struggling with the doctrine of determinism uncompromising and refuses expressly against human freedom. New arguments by using philosophical ideas used to defend the doctrine. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1206 W. M) the framers of the largest and most incisive of systematic rationalist theology, and eventually became an advocate Ash’arite flow, concludes the All-knowing only substances that can act. Doctrine through this, there is no room at all for human action, even, in the form of the doctrine of al-Ash’ārī kasb though. The concept was presented in a way to deepen and twist the psychological approach used Mu’tazila and by means of manipulating the theory of human motivation\textsuperscript{49}.

Ibn Rushd became the starting point journey Islamic science to Europe (the West) and the resurrection, and become a path leading to a Renaissance of modern Arabic after wading period of imitation and stagnation think in this modern era we met Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, the two figures are revitalize kalam as part of their renewal movement. The first figure in his book al-Radd alā al-Dabriyyin (disclaimer on the materialists) is the second figure with his treatise monotheism. To be sure we are amazed to watch the two men when start talking about “kalam” first-generation intellectuals around the issue of al-Jabr (determination) and al-ikhṭiār (free will) also other issues\textsuperscript{50}.

\textsuperscript{50}al-Jabiri, Tragedi Intlektual, 98.
In Western philosophy, Averroes rejected in advance by mistake received later understood it, so bring the Western world to change and progress towards the formation of the reform era and Renaissance. In the Islamic world (East) thought Averroes lost compared to the thinking of the Imām al-Gazālī. Averroes appear in various works of the greatest European philosophers, Immanuel Kant, a philosopher from Germany which is very famous. There is no evidence that more tangible over the dominance of European thought until Kant, the 18th century AD.  

In the polemics that, seen in terms of their effect to Muslims around the world, al-Gazālī win in scintillating. As a result, some elements of Aristotle's doctrine that is in the field of metaphysics, its influence on Islamic thought stalled. But other elements of the Aristotelianism it, especially formal logic, thus reinforced by al-Gazālī, and later also by Averroes. Even Neoplatonism thus even pervasive in Sūfī thought al-Gazālī, Averroes and seen as an irony on al-Gazālī. Ghazali’s triumph did not, however, marked the end of Neoplatonism the influence upon Islam. We have noted the Neoplatonic tendency of al-Gazālī's own theology, even accusing him of Averroes are fair enough that it maintains the most doctrine critiquing the philosophers. More important is the contribution of al-Gazālī to Islamic mysticism (Sūfīsm), actually not Neoplatonic ideas may not exist in Sūfīsm (Sūfī movement, though the origins of that has been the subject of much disagreement), but with al-Gazālī ideas of Neoplatonism that became predominant.  

We may note that despite his serious reservations concerning Ibn Sīnā, his chief rival in the East, with respect to the theory of emanation, on the one hand, and the contingency of the universe, on the other, Ibn Rushd continued to accept a major tenet of Islamic Neo-Platonism, i.e. conjunction with the Active Intellect. The ultimate destiny of the soul, according to him, consisted in its liberation from the bondage of the body, whereby it is able to rejoin the intelligible world. For Ibn Rushd

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51 Ibid, 99.
it is through ‘conjunction’ with the Active Intellect, as Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Bajjah argued that the process of cognition consummated and the ‘possible’ intellect, which is for him eternal, becomes actualized. The subsequent history of Averroism, both in Islam and Western Europe, is particularly instructive. Ibn Rushd was criticized and vilified in the East and came under devastating attack in the West at the hands of ecclesiastical authorities in Paris in 1270 and 1277, on a variety of charges, such as the eternity of the world, the unity of the intellect and the denial of divine providence. His Latin Averroes supporters, with Siger de Brabant (d. 1281) at their head, imputed to him, erroneously we believe, the so-called thesis of Double Truth, according to which a proposition may be true in philosophy, but false in theology, or vice versa. In 1277, his books burned at the doorstep of the Sorbonne, less than a century after burned publicly in 1195 in Cordova. Nothing has consecrated the international standing of Averroes in philosophical quarters better than the fact that his commentaries on Aristotle have survived in Latin translation, whereas only a small part of these commentaries has survived in the original Arabic. Many of these Latin translations reprinted in modern editions in Europe and America.53

Although al-Gazālī’s assault on philosophy in the eleventh century was devastating, he had retained the right of reason to arbitrate in theological controversies, and distinguished clearly between those parts of philosophy ‘which clash with fundamental principles of religion’ and those that did not, like logic, ethics and mathematics. The latter, he argued, could only questioned by ‘an ignorant friend of Islam who is worse than a learned enemy’. Despite al-Gazālī’s reservations, however, the gap between philosophy and theology continued to widen during the next three centuries and beyond. The new anti-rationalism took one of two forms: (1). Return to the Hanbalite position, which rejected all philosophical, and even theological, methods of discourse, and clung to the sacred text, literally interpreted. (2). Acquiescence in mysticism or the Sūfī path,

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53Fakhry, Islamic Philosophy, 100.
which tried to circumvent those methods by recourse to the methods of direct communication with the Divine. Either through contemplation or organic union, as we have seen. With respect to theological reaction, Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Ibn Qayim al-Jawziyya (d. 1300) taken as the chief representatives of the Neo-Hanbalite position.54

Much of the opposition to different kinds of philosophy came from Muslims who believed that philosophy was bid‘ah (innovation or heresy) and product ideas that did not cohere with the Islamic creed. Perhaps an even greater threat to the Qur’ān is the use of philosophy at all to produce an alternative way of analyzing and understanding reality. Could it come to replace the Qur’ān as a route to knowledge? It could if its conclusions and principles are contrary to Islam, but otherwise there is no reason to think that it is any more opposed to Islam than any other form of knowledge such as mathematics or medicine. Of course, it said that the conclusions of philosophy often are opposed to religion. These arguments have dealt with by any religion that wishes to rest on secure intellectual foundations. However, there is no reason in general to think that in the encounter of faith and Islamic philosophy is any worse off than any other religion.55

Al-Gazālī was aware that in their new political circumstances, people needed different religious solutions. He disliked the Ismā‘īlī devotion to an infallible Imām: where was this Imām? How could ordinary people find him? This dependence upon an authority figure seemed to violate the egalitarianism of the Quran. Falsafah, he acknowledged, was indispensable for such disciplines as mathematics or medicine, but it could give no reliable guide to spiritual matters that lie beyond the use of reason. In al-Gazālī’s view, Sūfism was the answer, because its disciplines could lead to a direct apprehension of the divine. In the early days, the ‘ulama’ had alarmed by Sūfism, and regarded it as a dangerous fringe movement. Now al-Gazālī urged the religious scholars to

54Ibid.,102.
practice the contemplative rituals that the Sūfī mystics had developed and to promote this interior spirituality at the same time as they propagated the external rules of the Sharia. Both were crucial to Islam. Al-Gazālī had thus given mysticism a ringing endorsement, using his authority and prestige to assure its incorporation into mainstream Muslim life.56

By the end, however, through the influence of al-Gazālī except for extreme mystical positions that explicitly contradicted the official doctrine, it was incorporated within the mainstream of Islam, which had to be expanded accordingly. The Sūfis considered themselves to represent a profounder Islam than the ulama, because they paid attention to its inner aspects, spirituality, and religious experience. In practice, Sūfism gave rise to a kind of popular Islam that stresses miracles and the veneration of saints. Parallel to particular groups’ acceptance of individual Sūfis and their doctrines, in the social realm the religious brotherhoods or Sūfī orders (ṭuḥfaq) were admitted into the mainstream of Islam and Muslim societies. These brotherhoods became intimately connected with certain geographical areas (including quarters of town), professions, and social classes, and at certain times and places some of them had so much influence that they could almost be considered part of official Islam.57

The existence of Sūfism in Islamic history is also important from another point of view. Sūfī writings and the history of the different ṭuḥfaq are the principal sources for our knowledge of personal religious life and experience in Islam. Indeed, Islam as it was actually lived in the past, is difficult to discover. Most texts deal with the norms that should be adhered to and followed; the evidence about what people really believed and did is dispersed through historical, literary, and religious writings. Even if theologians like Ibn Taymiyya criticized certain abuses in their time, the precise extent to which such customs were actually practiced cannot be gauged. The influence of Sūfism on

everyday religious life in most places seems to have diminished significantly since the nineteenth century, whether because of the movements of return to a pure or purified Islam, the “scriptural” movement of the reformers who restored the authority of Qur’an and Sunnah against that of the Sufi shaykh or the traditional ‘ālim, the political use of Islam as an ideology, or the development of modernization through rationalization with its critical tendencies with regard to religion.\(^{58}\)

There are other claims that Islamic science setback with mysticism, it is true, along with the progress of Islamic civilization at the time, appeared a variety of spiritual and moral movement spearheaded by the Sufis. The point is purification of the soul and self-intensive. On development, these movements and then crystallized to tarekat sectarian with nonprofessional followers. Polarization Sufism is responsible bore false mystics and foster an irrational attitude among the public. Not a few of them were more interested in the mystical aspects of the supernatural, such as karāmah, magic, wonder and so on rather than on ubūdiyyah and moral aspects. The obsession has to obtain power of supernatural on these matters in turn, enrich various forms of bid'ah, takhayyl and khurāfah. As a result, growing is not science, but the magic (magic and shamanism) and various pseudo-sciences like astrology (za'iraja), physiognomy (qiyyāb, firāsah, palmistry), Geomancy, necromancy, munaarrabat (anfaq, tamīmah, amulets) and so forth. So it is more accurate to say that the decline of sciences caused by the practices of this kind, and not by the teachings of Sufism\(^{59}\).

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\(^{58}\)Ibid., 93.

gap between philosophy and theology continued to widen during the next three centuries and beyond. The new anti-rationalism took one of two forms: first, return to the Hanbalite position, which rejected all philosophical, and even theological, methods of discourse, and clung to the sacred text, literally interpreted. Second, acquiescence in mysticism or the Sufi path, which tried to circumvent those methods by recourse to the methods of direct communication with the Divine, either through contemplation or organic union, as we have seen.

**Conclusion**

Al-Gazālī’s attack on Islamic Neo-Platonism is embodied in his great polemical treatise, the Incoherence of the Philosophers (*Tabāṣfūt al-Falāsifah*). In the preface, he states that his aim is to show ‘the contradiction inherent in the opinions of their leader, the Absolute Philosopher and First Teacher [i.e. Aristotle] best rendered and interpreted by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, his best two expositors among the philosophizers of Islam. The *Tabāṣfūt al-Tabāṣfūt*, Ibn Rushd’s rebuttal of al-Gazālī’s own *Tabāṣfūt al-Falāsifah* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), is one of the great classics of philosophical–theological debate. In it, Ibn Rushd meticulously examines each one of al-Gazālī’s ‘twenty questions’ or strictures against the Muslim Peripatetic philosophers. Al-Gazālī singled three of these out as particularly damning: the eternity of the world, the denial of God’s knowledge of particulars, and the resurrection of the body. The role of ruler had caused al-Gazālī’s to criticize philosophy. In a similar vein, Ibn Rusyd criticism to *Tabāṣfūt al-Falāsifah* was supported by the ruler but at a different period. The implication of such debate in Islamic community was the growing of anti-rationalism in Islam and Islamic mysticism. Al-Gazālī did not cause the Islamic thought to decline; rather, the decline was caused by the fact that Muslims have been unfamiliar with the thinking of al-Gazālī.
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