AL-GAZĀLĪ’S CRITIQUE AGAINST THE MUSLIM PHILOSOPHERS IN TAHĀFUT AL-FALĀSIFAH

This article discusses al-Gazālī’s critiques in his Tahāfut al-Falāsifah against the Muslim. It answers two main questions: First, what is the purpose of al-Gazālī in writing Tahāfut al-Falāsifah? Second, is it true that this work represent the conflict between philosophy and dogma, between revelation and the ratio, or between orthodoxy and hetherodoxy? Content analysis and historical method are used to elucidate the criticism of al-Gazālī against the Muslim philosophers in Tahāfut al-Falāsifah . This study shows that instead of questioning the validity of logic on philosophical reasoning and methodology, al-Gazālī wrote Tahāfut al-Falāsifah in order to contest epistemological philosophical superiority claims advanced by Muslim philosophers. The critism of al-Gazālī cannot be seen as a reaction, or let alone rejection, of orthodoxy or dogma against the philosophy. Rather, his critical thought should be viewed as his attempt as a Muslim scholar to accept and adapt Greek philosophical tradition into the framework of Islamic thought.

Introduction theologian in the 11th century. He learned deeply the works of Ibn Sănā. Thereby, he realized that regardless of the fact that his thoughts become a serious challenge to the building thought of Ash"ariyyah. He also argued that the methodology of Ibn Sănā can also be used to update the Ash"ariy theology. 16 His thought on the ontology and cosmology apparently began to abandon atomism and occasionalism taught by classical Asy"ari theologians. 17 According to Robert Wisnovsky, al-Juwaynă together with contemporary Asy'ari theologians, pioneered the movement which he called " Avicennian tendency in Sunni theology." 18 After the death of Al-Juwaynă, al-Gazālă decided to be the escort "wanderer palace" (Mu'askar) of Nizam al-Mulk. This Saljuk prime minister was attracted by the intelligence of al-Gazālă, raising a young intellectual as Nizamiyya professor in Baghdad in 1091. He held this position until 1094. This fouryear period was the period he wrote the books about theology and philosophy. In these years, he completed a trilogy of philosophy: Maqās\ id al -Falāsifah, Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, and Miʽyār al-ʽIlm. From those three books, the most chronicle writing is Tahāfut. Hourani notes that this book was completed on January 11 th 1095 or Muharram 488/21. 19 Because Maqasid and Mi'yār were written as a supplement of Tahāfut, they obviously served as further explanation of Tahāfut. 20 Jules Janssens, who did the 16 Griffel,[29][30] Ibid., 128-133. 18 Robert Wisnovsky, "One Aspect of the Avicennian Turn in Sunnă Theology," Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (March 2004): 65-100. 19 George F. Hourani, "A Revised Chronology of Gazālă"s Writings," Journal of the American Oriental Society 104 (April-June 1984): 292-293. 20 The researchers who wrote about the chronology of the al-Ghazali's works generally assumed, because of his eksposisional character, Maqās\ id must have been written before Tahāfut; and Miʽyār, because is an attachment of Tahāfut, written afterward. Look Maurice Bouyges, Essai de chronologie des oeuvres de al-Ghazali (Algazel), ed. Michel Allard (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1959), 21-26; ʽAbd al-Rah} mān Badawă, Mu"allafāt al-Gazālī (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1977), 53-70; Hourani, "Revised Chronology," 292-293. However, Frank Griffel argued that the chronology of these third works especially Maqās\ id and Tahāfut are uncertain. There is a possibility that text analysis on Maqās\ id and Miʽyār, argued that both of the texts were prepared under the shadow of al-Fārābă and Ibn Sănā. Maqā╣id seems to be al-Gazālă"s translation of Ibn Sănā"s work in Persian, Dānish-Nāmeh ʽAlā"ī. Mi'yār contains summary of review of the logic in the works of al-Fārābă such as al-Qiyās al-S\ aghīr and al-Kitab al-Maqūlāt and the works of  Al-Gazālă also wrote the other exposition about the metaphysics called as Mi'yar al-'Aql. Unfortunately, we have only its incomllete manuscript. 22 In 1094, at the command of newly appointed caliph, Al-Mustazhir, al-Ghazali wrote Fad{ ā"ih} al-Bāt\ iniyyah wa FaD{ ā"il al-Mustaz\ hiriyyah. It is a polemical treatise against the Shi'a Isma'ilis group. This sect becomes a serious threat to the Seljuq dynasty, both militarily and theologically. Two years earlier, precisely on the 10th of Ramadan 485/14 October 1092, Niz} ām al-Mulk was stabbed by a fidā'ă on his way between Isfahan and Baghdad. The fidā'ă was directly killed without any interrogation. It caused many speculations about the mastermind behind this murder. 23 Tahāfut was written earlier than Maqās\ id; or that Maqās\ id was not written as a prelude of Tahāfut. Look his argument in al- Gazālī"s Philosophical,[35][36]also in Frank Griffel,"MS London,British Library Or. 3126 Âge 69, no. 1 (2002): 39-66. 22 About this book, look Griffel,"MS London, See the different analysis expressed by the following writers: Omid Safi, Politics of Knowledge, [74][75][76][77][78][79]Griffel,[36][37][38][39] This tragedy marked political crisis of Saljąq Dynasty in subsequent years. A month later, Malik Shāh died because of a fever he suffered after hunting. Sudden death of Malik Shāh immediately stimulated political competition and rivalry amongst his children from three different mothers. At first, between Barkiyaruq and Mahmud supported his mother, Terken Khatun. Meanwhile, Taj al-Mulk, a rival who was subsequently appointed as a replacement of Niz} ām al-Mulk, was killed by Niz\ āmiyyahthe supporters of Niz} ām al-Mulk. They accused Taj al-Mulk as the mastermind behind the murder of Niz} ām al-Mulk. This crisis ended with the death of Terken Khatun and her son, Mahmud, and the appointment of Berkiyaruq as sultan. 24 As a leading Shāfi'ă cleric, al-Gazālă was active in defending the caliphate of 'Abbāsiyah on one side. He, on the other side, tried to delegitimize the claims of the groups who are often called the Bāt\ iniyyah by his opponents. 25 Al-Gazālă"s moderate political position is driven by the desire to find a middle ground berween "idealism" and "real politics". 26 He did not hesitate to criticize the political practice of the authorities that deviated from religious guidance. He also offered political advice to the sultan, and act as a mediator whenever there was disagreement between the caliph and sultan.
In the month of Dhą"l-Qaʽdah 488/November 1095, al-Gazālī collapsed and suffered "spiritual crisis". 27 According to 24 About This Political Events, look Griffel,[36][37][38][39] About Al-Gazālă's polemic against the Shi'a Isma'ilis, look Farouk Mitha, Al-Gazālī and the Ismailis: A Debate on Reason and Authority in Medieval Islam (London: I.B. Tauris cooperating with Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2001), 1-160. 26 For the study of political thought of Al-Gazālă, look Henri Laoust, La politique de Ġazālī (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1970), 45; also Carole Hillenbrand, "Islamic Orthodoxy or Realpolitik? Al-Gazālī"s Views on Government," Iran 26 (1988): 81-94. 27 This episode in the life of al-Gazālă has been studied and analyzed by researchers. See the diverse interpretations given by, among others, D.B. Macdonald, "The Life of al-Ghazzālă, with especial reference to his religious experiences and opinions," Journal of the American Oriental Society 20 (January 1899): 71-132; Farid Jabre, "La biographie et l"oeuvre de Ghazali reconsidérées à la lumière des T} abaqat de Sobki." Mélanges de l"Institut his own admission in his autobiography, al-Munqidh min al-D{ alāl, the crisis was triggered by the inner consciousness that his motivation in the scientific and academic activity is just worldly interests. On the pretext of going to do the Hajj, he secretly traveled to Damascus, Jerusalem, Hebron, and H} ijāz. In front of the tomb of Abraham in Hebron, he swore not to visit the ruler again, accept a position from the ruler, and engage in academic debates. 28 He lived in those cities for two years and after that decided to return to Baghdad because of his longing to his family. 29 In these years, he completed his magnum opus about Sufism, Ih} yā" ʽUlūm al-Dīn. When in Jerusalem, he wrote a small treatise on Asy'ari theology, which he slipped as a chapter three in second book of Ih} yā" ʽUlūm al- Dīn, According to his students who came from Maghreb, Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi, al-Gazālī had arrived in Baghdad in 490/1097. 31 In 1106, because of the insistence of Fakhr al-Mulk, al-Gazālă was willing to teach in Nizamiyya Nishapur, filling the position formerly held by his teacher, al-Juwayni. In this time, his thought appeared as the controversy. The conservative clerics, who read the works of "esoteric" al-Ghazali such as Ih} yā", Mishkāt al-Anwār and Kīmiyā"-yi Saʽādat, argued that his thoughts in these books had deviated from tradition of Ash'ariyyah and mostly relied on the thinking of Muslim philosophers like Ibn Sănā and Ikhwān al-S\ afā", if it is not even the Zoroastrian teachings. A cleric from Maghrib was active in the campaign for opposing al-Gazālă. 32 The opponents of al-Gazālă initially delivered a petition to Sanjar that al-Gazālă: …don"t have any conviction of Islam, otherwise, he embraced the belief of the philosophers and the heretics (falasifah wa mulh} idān). He filled all his books with their words. He confounded the kufr (kufr) and the sleaze (abāt\ il) with the secrets of revelation. He called the true light of God and this is the belief of the Zoroastrians (madhhab-i majus), which teach the light and the darkness. 33 They seemed to have failed to oppose al-Gazālă. Thus, they took another path by scraping his past. Then they issued accusations that al-Gazālă had insulted Abu Hanifah in his work al-Mankhūlmin Ta'līqā 'Ilm al-Usul. Sanjar was an adherent of the Hanafi. This accusation was really serious and expected to ignite the anger of the sultan. But, this attempt was unsuccessful as well. 34 In this atmosphere, he wrote Fays\ al al-Tafriqah and his intellectual autobiography, al-Munqidh min al-D{ alāl. In the latter book, he offended the attack of the conservative clerics: A group of people, who are not solid in the mastery of knowledge and have not yet reached the highest level in madhhab, count on our writings about the secrets of religious knowledge. They thought these phrases were collected from the ancient utterance [the Greek philosophers], although in part was the result of reflection [of our own] -a horse trail may be similar to the footprints of others and the other horses collected from the books about the Shari'ah, some others even contained in the books of the Sufis. Suppose those phrases were indeed only in their books, but if the expression can be accepted by logic, supported by demonstration, and did not negate the Qur"an and Hadith, why should be discarded and abandoned? 35 Al-Gazālă spent the last years of his life in his native T\ ąs by practicing Sufism and teaching. However, the period of seclusion (uzla) is not without interruption. In 1110, D{ iyā" al-Dăn Ah} mad ibn Niz} ām al-Mulk, Sanjar"s brother, invited al-Gazālă to teach back in Nizamiyya Baghdad, replaced the Supreme Master who has just died, al-Kiyā" al-H{ arrāsă. He refused to say that he was no longer interested in "searching for pleasures" (t\ alab biziyādati dunyā) and that his turn was over. 36 And indeed shortly afterwards he followed the class comrades. He died in Tus on December 18, 1111.
Throughout his life, al-Gazālă has written no less than 400 books on various areas of Islamic studies especially law (fiqh), jurisprudence (usūl fiqh), theology, philosophy, and mysticism. Because of al-Gazālă"s breadth of encyclopedic knowledge, al-Gazālă"s students often had difficulty in determining whether he was a foremost jurist, theologian, philosopher or sufi. However, despite of these difficulties, it is certain that al-Gazālă studied philosophy in depth and it affected the style and the character of his writings. His works are logical, systematic, and persuasive. In al-'Awās\ im Miun al-Qawās\ im, Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi quoted the impression of a cleric namely Ahmad ibn S\ ālih} al-Jili who said that "[Al-Gazālă] steeped in encient studies (philosophy) in such a way to their concept (the philosophers) which dominant in his books." 37 Ibn al-'Arabi acknowledgment to his teacher"s achievement is his efforts to adopt and assimilate the methodology of philosophy into the building of Islamic thought. When talking about his works in the field of logic for example, he argued that al-Gazālă has unleashed the syllogism from the elements of philosophy. 38 These assessments and blasphemies which must be faced by Al-Gazālă in Nishapur, indicate that the 35 Al-Gazālă, al-Munqidh min al-D{ alāl, 26. 36 Brown, "Last Days," 94-95. 37 Ibn al-ʽArabă, Al-ʽAwās\ im min al-Qawās\ im, 330: "Wa dakhala fī ʽulūm alawā"il ilā an qāla: wa galaba ʽalayh istiʽmālu ʽibārātihim fi kutubihi." 38 Ibid.,78.
philosophy has a significant influence on his thoughts even after he embraced the mysticism as the way of life.

The Structure and the Content of Tahāfut al-Falāsifah
In al-Munqidh min al-D{ alāl, al-Gazālă looked at the work of his Tahāfut as a "radd," rebuttal or response to the falāsifah. 39 As explained by Gimaret,40 the book is titled as al-Radd 'Ala ... "response/answer to ..." has sprung up since the 2th H century/ 4th M. The radd literature was intended as a rebuttal or response by a writer on the idea or thought of groups who disagree with the writer. In the field of theology or Kalam, relying heavily on dialectics or academic debate, 41 this literature is abundant. The radd literature in theology (kalam) generally was arranged in the format of imaginary "discussion" with an opponent. In there, the opposing view is presented with details ("in qīla …"), followed by the writer's response ("fa-naqūlu ...") such that at the end of the discussion of the establishment of the opponents appear to be inconsistent or contradictory. In short, the establishment was flawed. 42 Tahāfut follow this strategy. From this perspective, Tahāfut actually is not a work that is unique in its genre.
Al-Gazālă arranged the Tahāfut in three core parts. The first part is introduction which consists of five sub-topics. The second part, which is the core of the book, is twenty chapters that contain the criticism of al-Gazālă on twenty philosophical problems that he saw were wrong. Sixteen problems come from the field of metaphysics; and the rest come from the natural sciences. The last part is conclusion or the cover which only consists of three short paragraphs.
In theintroduction, al-Gazālă explained the background of Tahāfut in the following paragraphs: I saw a group of people who are surely different from their friends and colleagues through their unique intelligence and cleverness. They rejected the obligations in Islam related to worship, praying obligations, the prohibition from illicit goods and mocked the religious symbols. They also underestimate the worship and the provisions of Shari'ah. They did not want to hold back because of the provisions and the prohibition of Shari'ah. Otherwise, they completely broke away from the restraints of the religious teaching.
The base of their disbelief is just taqlid as it can be found among the Jews and the Christians ... and the speculative contemplation that arise since they stumbled on sophistic doubts that keep them away from the Truth ...
The source of their disbelief is that they heard the names of the great scholars [in the tradition of philosophy] such as Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and others. However, their followers" depiction of intelligence, an excess of their principles, and the details of their knowledge of geometry, logic, natural sciences, and metaphysics is excessively misleading. They explained that [the thought] they obtained merely with the ratio was able to find the conclusion. They also said that in addition to the highly intelligent and full of excess, the philosophers were also to deny the Shari'ah and religion. They rejected the details of the religious law because they are sure that the laws are only human creation and tricks.
When this information reached them, and the information about the teachings of [the philosopher] is accordance with their nature, they preened with kurf, in order to align with the sage, they said! They joined with the philosophers, exalteth himself above most people and the laity, and underestimated the complacency against the religious beliefs of their ancestors. They thought that exposing the intelligence by leaving to the right teaching of taqlid and then doing taqlid to the teachings that vanity is good. They did not realize that switching from a form of taqlid to the other taqlid is [a sign of] ignorance and confusion. 43 Through the paragraphs above, al-Gazālă told us that Tahāfut was motivated by antagonism toward intellectuals" lifestyle that claims to be adherents of the teachings of philosophy. They are reluctant to execute the commands of religion such as prayer or Shari'ah prohibitions such as drinking wine. This attitude, in his search, pushed by two things: First, the vanity and superior feelings over other thought and perspectives. Second, blind taqlid to the classical Greek philosophers. This taqlid departed from the assumption that all of the classical Greek philosophers" teachings, from mathematics till metaphysics, were derived from solid and demonstrative contemplation; it was impossible that they were wrong.
The accusation that the adherents of philosophy only made taqlid to "the great names" in their tradition is significant point to note. As the Asy'ari theologians used to be, Al-Gazālă created the opposition between 'ilm and taqlid or between 'āmma and khā╣╣a. This is in contrast to the opposition of distinction status according to the level of the knowledges. 'Āmmah group is mostly people who are not literate or do not have knowledge. They can only do follow others to gain knowledge or beliefs. Meanwhile, khā╣╣ah is an educated class that is able to do his own reasoning without relying on others. In al-Iqti╣ād fī"l-Iʽtiqād, al-Gazālă explained that 'ilm al-kalām is a fardhu kifaya science, the one whose obligation to pursue is communal and not personal, and that science is only mandatory for the educated who have the intelligence. 44 Most people were enough to do taqlid to the clerics or the theologians. However, doing taqlid to others is a big mistake for intellectuals who are able to think by themselves. For this educated class, the only individual who deserves to be followed is the Prophet Muhammad. In Faysal al-Tafriqa, Al-Gazālă wrote: If you ponder this problem honestly, you will realize that anyone who restricts the truth only on a thinker has approached to the disbelief and the hypocrisy. Firstly, he approached the kufr because he puts a thinker on par with the infallible Prophet... Secondly, he approached the hypocrisy because the job of a thinker to contemplation and taqlid is illegitimate for him. How could he talk [to the students], "You have to think by yourself; but you also should not produce the distorted thought of my thoughts "... would not this be hypocritical? 45 The Tahāfut was written to delegitimize the epistemological superiority claims which recognized by Falasifah. Al-Gazālă wanted to prove that not all of the teachings of the classical philosophers have reached the level of demonstrative as claimed by their followers. 46 Thus, the purpose of The Tahāfut is fully destructive, not constructive. Through this work, he wanted to unload, did not build. BecauseTahāfut in terms of methodology is full of dialectical character. Al-Gazālă wrote: Know that my goal [in this book] is to remind people who have a good prejudice to philosophers and believe that their method is free from contradiction with show [some] in terms of their confusion. For this reason, I would not argue with them except as a demanding and reneged, not one who claims [and] affirms. I will destroy their belief with [show] the consequences to the contrary. So, sometimes I would force them to follow the teachings of Mu'tazila, at other times Karrāmiya teachings, but at other times Wāqifiya teachings. However, I did not intend to defend one of these madhhabs. I just make the madhhabs as a weapon against them. 47 Al-Gazālă reminded that we could not simply contrast philosophy with religion. According to him, there are three possible religious positions that opposed with the philosophy. The first is the difference which is just purely verbal problem, as is the habit of philosophers to refer to God as a "substance." According to him, the problem like this is not necessary disputed because in essence, both the philosophers and ordinary Muslims alike believe in the existence of God and argue that it will only end on the lexical dispute. 48 . 45 Al-Gazālă, Fays\ al al-Tafriqah, 22-23. Băją text is using tanāqud{ words, "kontradiksi" for "hypocritical" my translation follows Griffel, "Taqlăd of the Philosophers," 281. 46 Jules Janssens, "Al-Gazālă"s Tahāfut: Is It Really a Rejection of Ibn Sănā"s Philosophy?" Journal of Islamic Studies 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 1-17, doing hujjah that the target of The Tahāfut attack "seems to be the philosophy of ancient [Greece], especially metaphysics, and acceptance of its teachings uncritically," is not Ibn Sănā. This opinion seems rather hard to accept.
The second aspect is the doctrine of the philosophers which did not contrary with the fundamentals of religion. Al-Gazālă divided the the field of philosophical studies into six fields: (a) the arithmetic, (b) logical, (c) the natural sciences, (d) metaphysics, (e) political and (f) ethics. 49 Among the six fields of this study, Tahāfut poured out only to question a number of falasifah conclusions in the field of metaphysics and natural science. He did not refuse other fields such as politics, ethics, and even more arithmetic. He said "rejecting this issue is not a prerequisite of faith in the prophets and apostles." 50 The last aspect is the doctrine of the philosophers which obviously contrary to the fundamentals of religion as their teachings in the natural creation problem, the attributes of God, and the physical resurrection of the humand race on the Day of Judgment. 51 According to him, Tahāfut was written to reject the doctrine of this last category. Twentieth chapters of Tahāfut are arranged in an imaginary dialogue format between al-Gazālă and Muslim philosophers. Every argument they advance is broken by al-Gazālă with the arguments which he had taken from the various sources.
Thereby, Al-Gazālă did not intend to delegitimize the logic of a methodology of thinking. He only intended to prove that a number of the falāsifah theses in metaphysics and natural science did not reach a prerequisite demonstrative (burhan) as determined by their own. At the end of his Introduction of Tahāfut, al-Gazālă asserted: We will show that in the field of metaphysics, they (the philosophers) are unable to fulfill the preconditions set out in the various parts of the logic and the introduction, as they described in the book Al-Burhãn about the terms of the truth of the syllogism, premise, and in the book of al-qiyas about the terms of the syllogism figure, and other things which they teach in Isagogedan Categoriae. 52 The twenty chapters of Tahāfut talk about the philosophical themes ranging from nature up to the physical resurrection of on the Day of Resurrection. The problem is not whether these theses are right or wrong, but whether these theses can be proved demonstratively or not. Chapter 17 of Tahāfut, for example, explores the theory of causality, 53 deployied to delegitimize the theory of causality of Ibn Sănā. Here, al-Gazālă's goal is not to reject the theory of causality, but rather to destroy the thesis of Ibn Sănā that the causal relationship is necessary and essential; and that this thesis has achieved the demonstrative status. 54 The strategy is currently suing demonstrability of Ibn Sănā's theory will probably remind us to the strategy of the empiricists such as David Hume. He wrote: The relationship between something that is customarily believed as the cause and something that is believed as a result it is not necessarily in our opinion. Otherwise [if exist] two objects, where one is not the other, and the affirmation that the first object is not sure to affirm the existence of other objects as well as objects first negation is not necessarily negate the other objects, it is not necessarily the existence of the first objects that would require the presence of other objects and the absence of the first things that do not necessarily require the absence of other objects-for example, between satisfying the thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning and fire, light and the rising of the sun, death and beheadings, healing and taking medication, ... and the other examples that can be observed in the objects that are linked in medicine, astronomy, art, and skill. The interrelationship between the two is because of the ordinance of God who created it together, not because both are necessary and inseparable. On the contrary, [God] is able to create satiety without eating, death without beheading, maintaining life after beheading, and so on. The philosophers rejected the the possibility of [this] and considered impossible. 55 At a glance, a rebuttal of al-Gazālă above seems to defend the establishment of occasionalism about the nature. However, instead of defending Occasionalism, he emphasized the phenomenal characteristics of natural events such as the burning of fabrics after contacting with the fire and that the phenomenon can be explained by two theories, which are equally valid: They did not have any evidence other than the observation that the combustion occurs after contacting with flame. Observation (mushāhadah) only shown the events that took place after (al-╪u╣ūl 'indahu), not because (al-u╣ūl bihi) [something else] and that there"s no cause ('illah) again in others. 56 Then, Al-Gazālă sequentially exposes both theories. The first is theory of occassionalism which argues that the only agent who creates the event scorching of the fabric is God, not the fire, whether directly or through an intermediary angel. 57 The second theory explains that the object in the nature does have specific properties and causality, but in a secondary sense. The causal relationship arises because of the provision or the ordinance of God, not because its essence should be as such. 58 Here, al-Gazālă did not explain which of two theories that he follows.

Adaptation and Appropriation: Al-Gazālī's Philosophy
Al-Gazālă's rejection against a number of the philosophical theses in metaphysics and natural science implies that he did not object to their theses in other fields or even their approach and methodology in philosophy generally. He wanted to show the weakness of philosophical thoughts in these fields. Regarding the validity of the logic as a methodology of thinking, for example, he stressed that this science is the discipline of neutral knowledge. In his book in response to the Isma'ilis, al-Qist\ ās al-Mustaqim, al-Gazālă reads several verses which he patterns according to figures of categorical and disjunctive syllogism. 59 Through this book, al-Gazālă certainly does not mean to say that the Aristotelian and Stoic syllogism are "supported" by the verses of the Qur'an, but that, in essence, the ratio and the revelation teach the same things and come to the equal conclusion. In Munqidz, al-Gazālă reminds every Muslim in order not to get stuck in one of two extreme attitudes in dealing with philosophy. The first is to blindly accept to anything that is taught by the philosophers without investigating the status and level of the truth. Many people seeing the ancient Greek philosophers as great experts who unrivaled in the field of the logic or mathematics conclude that their teachings on metaphysics must have the same degree of accuracy as mathematics. According to al-Gazālă, this is the error which arises because of blind taqlid. 60 The second extreme attitude is that some believers who have strong religiosity but do not have enough base of knowledge (s\ adīq jāhil) see philosophy in terms of its teachings. They perceive that all the ideas of the philosophers are wrong, even that has proved demonstratively by logic. They are in the sarcastic phrase of al-Gazālă. They thought that the religion of Islam is based on stupidity. They do not understand that such an attitude will endanger Islamic thought. It may incite a view that Islam is indeed a religion that against science or wisdom. 61 For al-Gazālă, it seems that rejecting the demonstrability of philosophical theses is one thing; while accepting and utilizing these theses is something else. In Tahāfut, al-Gazālă emphasizes that philosophers are unable to prove "the existence of God," or that "God is one." 62 But, of course it does not mean that al-Gazālă do not believe in the existence of God or monotheism.
If you expected God to make you full without bread, or making bread moves to you, or order his angels to chew for you and watched it move to your stomach-it will only show the folly of his actions! 66 He also utilizes the hierarchy of being introduced by Ibn Sănā to explain the meaning of a text of five levels of existence in Faysal al-Tafriqa. In this book, al-Ghazali explained that form which designated by a word in the text of Qur"ãn or Hadith has five possible existence: ( The conservative clerics attacked him in Nishapur when he was teaching at Nizamiyya. As a result, readers of al-Gazālă who switched from Tahāfut to his other works will get the impression that the book is called first; he was doing skeptical games against philosophy. 69 Tahāfut is an influential book in the scientific tradition of Islam in subsequent periods. However, its impact should not be overstated. The book indeed refutes many aspects of philosophical view by Muslim philosophers and sparks other writings. 70 Ironically, the main critics of Tahāfut are students or the heirs of al-Gazālă's own thoughts. The earliest was Fakhr al-D{ ăn al-Rāză, eccentric Ash'ari theologian of the 12th century. In a series of public debate which he did in Iran, openly he discredited of Tahāfut and considered methodologically weak. 71 In the West, a major critic of al-Gazālă is Ibn Rushd. 72 He wrote Tahāfut al-Tahāfut to prove that the works of al-Gazālă was "largely has not reached yet the level of demonstrative [as he claims]." 73 Finally, in the 15th century, Khojazādeh peeled the weaknesses of al-Gazālă's approach in responding to the teachings of the philosophy. 74 The Recent studies about the development of the philosophy study and logic in the Islamic world after the 5th century/11th show that the assumptions and the generalizations (that Tahāfut destroys philosophy in Islam) is exaggeration. 75 According to Ansary, Tahāfut should be regarded as a representation of the emergence of Nominalist criticismagainst Aristotelian philosophy. 76 Nominalism is usually understood as a school of thought which rejects the existence of abstract objects or the universal in metaphysics. Through Tahāfut, al-Gazālă challenges the Peripatetic philosopher to prove their theses elegantly. He challengs them not to be dogmatic in scientific discourse because science is always open to critics.

Conclusion
This article has provided some critical analyses about al-Gazālă's views on philosophy and the role of Tahāfut al-Falasifa in it. Al-Gazālă wrote Tahāfut for contestation against the superiority claims of philosophy epistemological superiority claims. In the 20 chapters of this book, he rejected the claim that the conclusions of the classical philosophers (in particular themes in the field of metaphysics and natural science) had achieved the status of a demonstrative argument. Thereby, al-Gazālă's criticism against philosophers is simply directed at their conclusions. He was not questioning the validity of the logic of the methodology of philosophical reasoning. In contrast, al-Gazālă accepts the logic of methodology and demonstrative criteria (burhan/apodeixis) as a tool to measure the scientific truth and takes advantage of this methodology to sue the philosophical conclusions. Thus, al-Gazālă is fully rationalist in his thought.
The role of al-Gazālă in the development of philosophy in Islam should not be seen as a destructive. The criticism of al-Gazālă in Tahāfut can not be seen as a reaction to the philosophical dogma or orthodoxy. He should be seen as a Muslim cleric who holds an important role in naturalization and adaptation of the Greek philosophical tradition into the building of Islamic thought. Al-Gazālă is an eclectic thinker and tends to be synthesis. He rejectes parts of Muslim philosopher"s views that he thinks are contrary to fundamental Islamic principles while adopting and modifying other parts which are free from contorversies. For example, he advocated using Aristotelian logic in jurisprudence (usul fiqh) and theology (kalam), neo-Platonic cosmology and Avicennian psychology in theology and mystical teachings. After the death of al-Gazālă, the philosophy has ceased to be a school of thought that stands alone. However, the particular aspects of his thought system are