AL-GAZĀLĪ’S CRITIQUE AGAINST THE MUSLIM PHILOSOPHERS IN TAHĀFUT AL-FALĀSIFAH

Qurrotul Aini
STAI Al-Falah As-Sunniyah Kencong-Jember, Jawa Timur
Email: jayaaini@gmail.com

Abstract: This article discusses al-Gazālī’s critiques in his Tabājut al-Falāsifah against the Muslim. It answers two main questions: First, what is the purpose of al-Gazālī in writing Tabājut al-Falāsifah? Second, is it true that this work represent the conflict between philosophy and dogma, between revelation and the ratio, or between orthodoxy and heterodoxy? Content analysis and historical method are used to elucidate the criticism of al-Gazālī against the Muslim philosophers in Tabājut al-Falāsifah. This study shows that instead of questioning the validity of logic on philosophical reasoning and methodology, al-Gazālī wrote Tabājut al-Falāsifah in order to contest epistemological philosophical superiority claims advanced by Muslim philosophers. The criticism of al-Gazālī cannot be seen as a reaction, or let alone rejection, of orthodoxy or dogma against the philosophy. Rather, his critical thought should be viewed as his attempt as a Muslim scholar to accept and adapt Greek philosophical tradition into the framework of Islamic thought.

Keywords: Criticism, Al-Gazālī, Muslim philosophers, Tabājut al-Falāsifah, Greek philosophers

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v20i1.805
Introduction

ABŪ ḤĀMID Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Gazālī wrote *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, an exposition about the teaching of philosophy taught by Ibn Sīnā. In his works which talk about ethics and psychology, like *Mīzān al-Amal*, *Iḥyā’ Ulūm al-Dīn*, and *Maʿārij al-Quds fī Madārij Maʿrifah al-Nafs*, he exposed his ethical and psychological system that is apparently inherited from Ibn Sīnā. He also wrote a number of books which confirm the support of Aristotelian logic and advocate his theologian fellows and jurist, in order to adopt and exploit the logic in their discipline, i.e. *Miʿyār al-ʿIlm, Miḥak al-ʿNazar*, dan *al-Qistās al-Mustaqīm*. He even slipped a chapter that contains the introduction of logic in his main paper about *al-Uṣūl al-Fiḥāb, al-Mustaṣfā min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl*.¹ In the other part, in his famous work, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, al-Gazālī criticized twenty precepts of philosophy which were considered incorrect. Not only that, in *Khātimah*, or the cover of the book, he even argued that three of the twenty are contrary to the precept of Islamic doctrine. Those three precepts include: (1) natural azali; (2) God’s knowledge about the general aspects of the nature, not the particular; and (3) the spiritual dimension of the reward and punishment in the afterlife.

The Muslim philosophers who believed in the third precept have lapsed. Therefore, they deserve to be punished firmly by Shari‘ah, i.e. given the death punishment.² Al-Gazālī repeated this fatwa in some of his other works such us *Fayṣal al-Tafrīqah, Iḥyā’ Ulūm al-Dīn*, dan *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*.³ How do we

---


explain this mismatch? Borrowing the famous phrase from Ibn Tufyal, “Why is al-Gazālī in a time so tight but in other time he was being loose?” against philosophy.\textsuperscript{4}

The reviewers of al-Gazālī’s reasoning generally perceive his criticism of Islamic philosophy in the \textit{Tahāfut} is part of the conflict between philosophy and dogma, between revelation and the ratio, or between orthodoxy and heterodoxy.\textsuperscript{5} Since al-Gazālī is a representation of the "dogma" or "orthodoxy" while philosophy represents the "rationalism" and "heterodoxy", a number of authors stress that criticism of al-Gazālī to philosophy has a destructive impact on Islamic thought. Tamim Ansari, in his famous work \textit{Destiny Disrupted}, described al-Gazālī as Asy'ari theologian who argued that "faith is never possible based on the ratio but it is only on revelation".\textsuperscript{6} In short, al-Gazālī had provided ‘ammunition' to 'people who want to turn away from philosophy and natural science' to 'appear respectable and intelligent when they were opposing to the philosophy and reason'.\textsuperscript{7}

\textbf{Al-Gazālī Encounters with Philosophical Tradition.}

There is no accurate information about the birth of al-Gazālī. 'Abd al-Gāfir al-Fārisī, the first historians who wrote the biography of al-Gazālī, did not provide information about the year of his birth.\textsuperscript{8} Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) predicted that he

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{5}See Majid Fakhry, \textit{A History of Islamic Philosophy (3rd edition)} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 223-239.
\item \textsuperscript{6}Tamim Ansary, \textit{Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World through Islamic Eyes} (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 110.
\item \textsuperscript{7}Ibid., 112, 113. Italics are from the writer.
\item \textsuperscript{8}‘Abd al-Gāfir al-Fārisī wrote the biography of al-Gazālī in \textit{al-Sīyāq li-Tārikh Naysābūr} that has been lost. The biography text comes to us through excerpts or summaries in the works of the next historians. The long version is available in Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, \textit{Tābaqāt al-Sha‘rī‘īyyah al-Kubra}, ed. ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ M. al-Ḥīw & Mahmūd M. al-Ṭanālī (Cairo: Maṭba‘ah Ḥisn al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1968), 203-214; in short version in Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-
was born in 450 / 1058. Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282) also mentioned these dates and also other opinions stating that he was born in the year of 451/1059. Recently, Frank Griffel suggested the dates are so far the most accurate opinion and based on the autobiographical record of al-Gazālī, i.e. his personal letters. He argued that al-Gazālī was probably born between 446/1054 and 448/1057, maybe in 448 1506-7.

According to Taj al-din-al-Subkī (d. 771/1370), al-Gazālī came from a poor family but they are pious. It was stated that her father was illiterate. He lived with spinning the wool, a profession called al-Gazzāl in Khurasan and Jurjan habits. This may be the origin of his name, al-Gazālī. However, this story is still not clear yet. Khallikan, quoted from Ibn al-Sam‘ānī, a historian from Persia who was close to al-Gazālī after 'Abd al-Ghafir al-Fārisī, stated that al-Gazālī name was derived from the name of his home town Gazālah. However Yaqūt (d. 626/1228), the geographers who visited the Tus in the 13th century, did not mention the name of the village in Mu'jam al-Buldān.

Al-Juwaynī is probably the most influential teacher in shaping the theological and philosophical thought of al-Gazālī. As shown by Griffel, al-Juwaynī was a reformer of Asy'ari

12Al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi‘īyyah, 193.
13Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-A’yān, 98.
14Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Mu’jam al-Buldān (vol. 5) (Beirut: Dār ʿĀṣim, 1977), 49-50.
theologian in the 11th century. He learned deeply the works of Ibn Sīnā. Thereby, he realized that regardless of the fact that his thoughts become a serious challenge to the building thought of Ash‘ariyyah. He also argued that the methodology of Ibn Sīnā can also be used to update the Ash‘ari theology.16 His thought on the ontology and cosmology apparently began to abandon atomism and occasionalism taught by classical Asy‘ari theologians.17 According to Robert Wisnovsky, al-Juwaynī together with contemporary Asy‘ari theologians, pioneered the movement which he called "'Avicennian tendency in Sunni theology."18

After the death of Al-Juwaynī, al-Gazālī decided to be the escort "wanderer palace" (Mu'askar) of Nizam al-Mulk. This Saljuk prime minister was attracted by the intelligence of al-Gazālī, raising a young intellectual as Nizamiyya professor in Baghdad in 1091. He held this position until 1094. This four-year period was the period he wrote the books about theology and philosophy. In these years, he completed a trilogy of philosophy: Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah, Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, and Mi‘yār al-'Ilm. From those three books, the most chronicle writing is Tahāfut. Hourani notes that this book was completed on January 11th 1095 or Muharram 488/21.19 Because Maqasid and Mi'yār were written as a supplement of Tahāfut, they obviously served as further explanation of Tahāfut.20 Jules Janssens, who did the

---

16 Griffel, al-Gazālī’s Philosophical, 29-30.
17 Ibid., 128-133.
20 The researchers who wrote about the chronology of the al-Ghazali’s works generally assumed, because of his eksposisional character, Maqāṣid must have been written before Tahāfut; and Mi‘yār, because is an attachment of Tahāfut, written afterward. Look Maurice Bouyges, Essai de chronologie des œuvres de al-Ghazâlî (Algazel), ed. Michel Allard (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1959), 21-26; 'Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, Mu'allafât al-Gazâlî (Beirut: Dâr al-Qalam, 1977), 53-70; Hourani, “Revised Chronology,” 292-293. However, Frank Griffel argued that the chronology of these third works especially Maqāṣid and Tahāfut are uncertain. There is a possibility that
text analysis on *Maqāṣid* and *Miʿyar*, argued that both of the texts were prepared under the shadow of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. *Maqāṣid* seems to be al-Gazālī’s translation of Ibn Sīnā’s work in Persian, *Dānish-Nāmeh 'Alā‘ī*. *Miʿyar* contains summary of review of the logic in the works of al-Fārābī such as *al-Qiyās al-Šaghib* and *al-Kitab al-Maqūlāt* and the works of Ibn Sīnā like *al-Najat*, *al-Ishārāt wa’l-Tanbihāt*, *Dānish-Nāmeh*, and the book of *al-Ḥudūd*. Al-Gazālī also wrote the other exposition about the metaphysics called as *Miʿyar al-ʿAql*. Unfortunately, we have only its incomplete manuscript.

In 1094, at the command of newly appointed caliph, Al-Mustazhir, al-Ghazali wrote *Faḍā‘il al-Bāṭiniyyah wa Faḍā‘il al-Mustāzhīrīyyah*. It is a polemical treatise against the Shi‘a Isma‘ilis group. This sect becomes a serious threat to the Seljuq dynasty, both militarily and theologically. Two years earlier, precisely on the 10th of Ramadan 485/14 October 1092, Niẓām al-Mulk was stabbed by a fidā‘ī on his way between Isfahan and Baghdad. The fidā‘ī was directly killed without any interrogation. It caused many speculations about the mastermind behind this murder.


23 See the different analysis expressed by the following writers: Omid Safi, *Politics of Knowledge*, 74-79; Griffel, *al-Gazālī’s Philosophical*, 36-39.
This tragedy marked political crisis of Saljūq Dynasty in subsequent years. A month later, Malik Shāh died because of a fever he suffered after hunting. Sudden death of Malik Shāh immediately stimulated political competition and rivalry amongst his children from three different mothers. At first, between Barkiyaruq and Mahmud supported his mother, Terken Khatun. Meanwhile, Taj al-Mulk, a rival who was subsequently appointed as a replacement of Niżām al-Mulk, was killed by Niżāmiyyah – the supporters of Niżām al-Mulk. They accused Taj al-Mulk as the mastermind behind the murder of Niżām al-Mulk. This crisis ended with the death of Terken Khatun and her son, Mahmud, and the appointment of Barkiyaruq as sultan.  

As a leading Shāfi‘ī cleric, al-Gazālī was active in defending the caliphate of 'Abbāsiyah on one side. He, on the other side, tried to delegitimize the claims of the groups who are often called the Baṭinīyyah by his opponents. Al-Gazālī’s moderate political position is driven by the desire to find a middle ground between ‘idealism’ and ‘real politics’. He did not hesitate to criticize the political practice of the authorities that deviated from religious guidance. He also offered political advice to the sultan, and act as a mediator whenever there was disagreement between the caliph and sultan.

In the month of Dhū‘l-Qa’dah 488/November 1095, al-Gazālī collapsed and suffered "spiritual crisis". According to

---

24 About This Political Events, look Griffel, al-Gazālī's Philosophical, 36-39.


his own admission in his autobiography, *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*, the crisis was triggered by the inner consciousness that his motivation in the scientific and academic activity is just worldly interests. On the pretext of going to do the Hajj, he secretly traveled to Damascus, Jerusalem, Hebron, and Ḥijāz. In front of the tomb of Abraham in Hebron, he swore not to visit the ruler again, accept a position from the ruler, and engage in academic debates. He lived in those cities for two years and after that decided to return to Baghdad because of his longing to his family. In these years, he completed his magnum opus about Sufism, *Iḥyāʾ ʿUlīm al-Dīn*. When in Jerusalem, he wrote a small treatise on Asy'ari theology, which he slipped as a chapter three in second book of *Iḥyāʾ ʿUlīm al-Dīn, al-Risālah al-Qudṣiyyah*. According to his students who came from Maghreb, Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi, al-Gazālī had arrived in Baghdad in 490/1097.

In 1106, because of the insistence of Fakhr al-Mulk, al-Gazālī was willing to teach in Nizamiyya Nishapur, filling the position formerly held by his teacher, al-Juwayni. In this time, his thought appeared as the controversy. The conservative clerics, who read the works of "esoteric" al-Ghazali such as *Iḥyāʾ*, *Mishkāt al-Anwār* and *Kīmiyā ’yi Saʿādat*, argued that his thoughts in these books had deviated from tradition of Ash'ariyyah and mostly relied on the thinking of Muslim philosophers like Ibn Sīnā and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, if it is not even the Zoroastrian

---


teachings. A cleric from Maghrib was active in the campaign for opposing al-Gazâlî. 32

The opponents of al-Gazâlî initially delivered a petition to Sanjar that al-Gazâlî:

...don’t have any conviction of Islam, otherwise, he embraced the belief of the philosophers and the heretics (jalâsîfâb wa muhîdîn). He filled all his books with their words. He confounded the kufr (kûfr) and the sleaze (abâ'îd) with the secrets of revelation. He called the true light of God and this is the belief of the Zoroastrians (madhhab-i majûs), which teach the light and the darkness. 33

They seemed to have failed to oppose al-Gazâlî. Thus, they took another path by scraping his past. Then they issued accusations that al-Gazâlî had insulted Abu Hanifah in his work al-Mankhûlmin Ta’lîqâ 'Ilm al-Usul. Sanjar was an adherent of the Hanafî. This accusation was really serious and expected to ignite the anger of the sultan. But, this attempt was unsuccessful as well.34

In this atmosphere, he wrote Fayšal al-Tafrîqah and his intellectual autobiography, al-Munqîdh min al-Ḍalâl. In the latter book, he offended the attack of the conservative clerics:

A group of people, who are not solid in the mastery of knowledge and have not yet reached the highest level in madhhab, count on our writings about the secrets of religious knowledge. They thought these phrases were collected from the ancient utterance [the Greek philosophers], although in part was the result of reflection [of our own] – a horse trail may be similar to the footprints of others and the other horses collected from the books about the Shari'ah, some others even contained in the books of the Sufis. Suppose those phrases were indeed only in their books, but if the expression can be accepted by logic,
supported by demonstration, and did not negate the Qur’an and Hadith, why should be discarded and abandoned.\(^{35}\)

Al-Gazālī spent the last years of his life in his native Tūs by practicing Sufism and teaching. However, the period of seclusion (uzla) is not without interruption. In 1110, Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Nizām al-Mulk, Sanjar’s brother, invited al-Gazālī to teach back in Nizamiyya Baghdad, replaced the Supreme Master who has just died, al-Kiyā’ al-Ḥarrāsī. He refused to say that he was no longer interested in "searching for pleasures" (tālab bi-ziyādati dunyā) and that his turn was over.\(^{36}\) And indeed shortly afterwards he followed the class comrades. He died in Tus on December 18, 1111.

Throughout his life, al-Gazālī has written no less than 400 books on various areas of Islamic studies especially law (fiqh), jurisprudence (usāl fiqh), theology, philosophy, and mysticism. Because of al-Gazālī’s breadth of encyclopedic knowledge, al-Gazālī’s students often had difficulty in determining whether he was a foremost jurist, theologian, philosopher or sufi. However, despite of these difficulties, it is certain that al-Gazālī studied philosophy in depth and it affected the style and the character of his writings. His works are logical, systematic, and persuasive. In al-'Awāṣim Miin al-Qawāṣim, Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi quoted the impression of a cleric namely Ahmad ibn Šāliḥal-Jili who said that "[Al-Gazālī] steeped in ancient studies (philosophy) in such a way to their concept (the philosophers) which dominant in his books."\(^{37}\) Ibn al-'Arabi acknowledgment to his teacher’s achievement is his efforts to adopt and assimilate the methodology of philosophy into the building of Islamic thought. When talking about his works in the field of logic for example, he argued that al-Gazālī has unleashed the syllogism from the elements of philosophy.\(^{38}\) These assessments and blasphemies which must be faced by Al-Gazālī in Nishapur, indicate that the

\(^{35}\)Al-Gazālī, al-Munjidh min al-Ḍalāl, 26.
\(^{38}\)Ibid., 78.
philosophy has a significant influence on his thoughts even after he embraced the mysticism as the way of life.

The Structure and the Content of *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*

In *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*, al-Gazālī looked at the work of his *Tabājut* as a "radd," rebuttal or response to the *falāsifah.* As explained by Gimaret, the book is titled as *al-Radd 'Ala ..." response/answer to ..."* has sprung up since the 2th H century/4th M. The *radd* literature was intended as a rebuttal or response by a writer on the idea or thought of groups who disagree with the writer. In the field of theology or Kalam, relying heavily on dialectics or academic debate, this literature is abundant. The *radd* literature in theology (kalam) generally was arranged in the format of imaginary "discussion" with an opponent. In there, the opposing view is presented with details ("in qīla ..."), followed by the writer's response ("fa-naqūlu ...") such that at the end of the discussion of the establishment of the opponents appear to be inconsistent or contradictory. In short, the establishment was flawed. *Tabājut* follow this strategy. From this perspective, *Tabājut* actually is not a work that is unique in its genre.

Al-Gazālī arranged the *Tabājut* in three core parts. The first part is introduction which consists of five sub-topics. The second part, which is the core of the book, is twenty chapters that contain the criticism of al-Gazālī on twenty philosophical problems that he saw were wrong. Sixteen problems come from the field of metaphysics; and the rest come from the natural

---

41 Josef van Ess, “The Beginnings of Islamic Theology,” in *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, ed. John E. Murdoch and Edith D. Sylla (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975), 87-111. argued that Kalam came from and distinctively "dialogue" or "discussion"
sciences. The last part is conclusion or the cover which only consists of three short paragraphs.

In the introduction, al-Gazālī explained the background of *Tahāfut* in the following paragraphs:

I saw a group of people who are surely different from their friends and colleagues through their unique intelligence and cleverness. They rejected the obligations in Islam related to worship, praying obligations, the prohibition from illicit goods and mocked the religious symbols. They also underestimate the worship and the provisions of Shari'ah. They did not want to hold back because of the provisions and the prohibition of Shari'ah. Otherwise, they completely broke away from the restraints of the religious teaching.

The base of their disbelief is just *taqlid* as it can be found among the Jews and the Christians ... and the speculative contemplation that arise since they stumbled on sophistic doubts that keep them away from the Truth ...

The source of their disbelief is that they heard the names of the great scholars [in the tradition of philosophy] such as Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and others. However, their followers’ depiction of intelligence, an excess of their principles, and the details of their knowledge of geometry, logic, natural sciences, and metaphysics is excessively misleading. They explained that [the thought] they obtained merely with the ratio was able to find the conclusion. They also said that in addition to the highly intelligent and full of excess, the philosophers were also to deny the Shari'ah and religion. They rejected the details of the religious law because they are sure that the laws are only human creation and tricks.

When this information reached them, and the information about the teachings of [the philosopher] is accordance with their nature, they preened with kurf, in order to align with the sage, they said! They joined with the philosophers, exaltheh himself above most people and the laity, and underestimated the complacency against the religious beliefs of their ancestors. They thought that exposing the intelligence by leaving to the right teaching of *taqlid* and then doing *taqlid* to the teachings that vanity is good. They did not realize that switching from a form of *taqlid* to the other *taqlid* is [a sign of] ignorance and confusion.43

Through the paragraphs above, al-Gazālī told us that *Tahāfut* was motivated by antagonism toward intellectuals’ lifestyle that claims to be adherents of the teachings of philosophy. They are

---

reluctant to execute the commands of religion such as prayer or Shari’ah prohibitions such as drinking wine. This attitude, in his search, pushed by two things: First, the vanity and superior feelings over other thought and perspectives. Second, blind taqlid to the classical Greek philosophers. This taqlid departed from the assumption that all of the classical Greek philosophers’ teachings, from mathematics till metaphysics, were derived from solid and demonstrative contemplation; it was impossible that they were wrong.

The accusation that the adherents of philosophy only made taqlid to "the great names" in their tradition is significant point to note. As the Asy'ari theologians used to be, Al-Gazālī created the opposition between 'ilm and taqlid or between 'āmma and khāṣṣa. This is in contrast to the opposition of distinction status according to the level of the knowledges. 'Ammah group is mostly people who are not literate or do not have knowledge. They can only do follow others to gain knowledge or beliefs. Meanwhile, khāṣṣah is an educated class that is able to do his own reasoning without relying on others. In al-Iqtiṣād fi’l-I’tiqād, al-Gazālī explained that 'ilm al-kalām is a fardhu kifaya science, the one whose obligation to pursue is communal and not personal, and that science is only mandatory for the educated who have the intelligence.44

Most people were enough to do taqlid to the clerics or the theologians. However, doing taqlid to others is a big mistake for intellectuals who are able to think by themselves. For this educated class, the only individual who deserves to be followed is the Prophet Muhammad. In Faysal al-Tafriqa, Al-Gazālī wrote:

If you ponder this problem honestly, you will realize that anyone who restricts the truth only on a thinker has approached to the disbelief and the hypocrisy. Firstly, he approached the kufr because he puts a thinker on par with the infallible Prophet... Secondly, he approached the hypocrisy because the job of a thinker to contemplation and taqlid is illegitimate for him. How could he talk [to the students], "You have to

think by yourself; but you also should not produce the distorted thought of my thoughts "... would not this be hypocritical?\(^{45}\)

The *Tahāfut* was written to delegitimize the epistemological superiority claims which recognized by Falasifah. Al-Gazālī wanted to prove that not all of the teachings of the classical philosophers have reached the level of demonstrative as claimed by their followers.\(^{46}\) Thus, the purpose of The *Tahāfut* is fully destructive, not constructive. Through this work, he wanted to unload, did not build. Because *Tahāfut* in terms of methodology is full of dialectical character. Al-Gazālī wrote:

Know that my goal [in this book] is to remind people who have a good prejudice to philosophers and believe that their method is free from contradiction with show [some] in terms of their confusion. For this reason, I would not argue with them except as a demanding and reneged, not one who claims [and] affirms. I will destroy their belief with [show] the consequences to the contrary. So, sometimes I would force them to follow the teachings of Mu'tazila, at other times Karrāmiya teachings, but at other times Wāqifiya teachings. However, I did not intend to defend one of these madhhabs. I just make the madhhabs as a weapon against them.\(^{47}\)

Al-Gazālī reminded that we could not simply contrast philosophy with religion. According to him, there are three possible religious positions that opposed with the philosophy. The first is the difference which is just purely verbal problem, as is the habit of philosophers to refer to God as a "substance." According to him, the problem like this is not necessary disputed because in essence, both the philosophers and ordinary Muslims alike believe in the existence of God and argue that it will only end on the lexical dispute.\(^{48}\).


\(^{46}\)Jules Janssens, “Al-Gazālī’s Tahāfut: Is It Really a Rejection of Ibn Sīnā’s Philosophy?" *Journal of Islamic Studies* 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 1-17, doing hujjah that the target of The Tahāfut attack "seems to be the philosophy of ancient [Greece], especially metaphysics, and acceptance of its teachings uncritically," is not Ibn Sīnā. This opinion seems rather hard to accept.


\(^{48}\)Ibid., 5.
The second aspect is the doctrine of the philosophers which did not contrary with the fundamentals of religion. Al-Gazālī divided the field of philosophical studies into six fields: (a) the arithmetic, (b) logical, (c) the natural sciences, (d) metaphysics, (e) political and (f) ethics.⁴⁹ Among the six fields of this study, Tahāfut poured out only to question a number of falasifah conclusions in the field of metaphysics and natural science. He did not refuse other fields such as politics, ethics, and even more arithmetic. He said "rejecting this issue is not a prerequisite of faith in the prophets and apostles."⁵₀

The last aspect is the doctrine of the philosophers which obviously contrary to the fundamentals of religion as their teachings in the natural creation problem, the attributes of God, and the physical resurrection of the human race on the Day of Judgment.⁵¹ According to him, Tahāfut was written to reject the doctrine of this last category. Twentieth chapters of Tahāfut are arranged in an imaginary dialogue format between al-Gazālī and Muslim philosophers. Every argument they advance is broken by al-Gazālī with the arguments which he had taken from the various sources.

Thereby, Al-Gazālī did not intend to delegitimize the logic of a methodology of thinking. He only intended to prove that a number of the falasifah theses in metaphysics and natural science did not reach a prerequisite demonstrative (burhān) as determined by their own. At the end of his Introduction of Tahāfut, al-Gazālī asserted:

We will show that in the field of metaphysics, they (the philosophers) are unable to fulfill the preconditions set out in the various parts of the logic and the introduction, as they described in the book Al-Burhān about the terms of the truth of the syllogism, premise, and in the book of al-qiyaṣ about the terms of the syllogism figure, and other things which they teach in Isagoge dan Categoriae.⁵²

The twenty chapters of Tahāfut talk about the philosophical themes ranging from nature up to the physical resurrection of

---

⁵₀ Al-Gazālī, Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, 5-6.
⁵¹ Ibid., 7.
on the Day of Resurrection. The problem is not whether these theses are right or wrong, but whether these theses can be proved demonstratively or not. Chapter 17 of Tahāfut, for example, explores the theory of causality,\(^\text{53}\) deployed to delegitimize the theory of causality of Ibn Sīnā. Here, al-Gazālī's goal is not to reject the theory of causality, but rather to destroy the thesis of Ibn Sīnā that the causal relationship is necessary and essential; and that this thesis has achieved the demonstrative status.\(^\text{54}\) The strategy is currently suing demonstrability of Ibn Sīnā's theory will probably remind us to the strategy of the empiricists such as David Hume. He wrote:

The relationship between something that is customarily believed as the cause and something that is believed as a result it is not necessarily in our opinion. Otherwise [if exist] two objects, where one is not the other, and the affirmation that the first object is not sure to affirm the existence of other objects as well as objects first negation is not necessarily negate the other objects, it is not necessarily the existence of the first objects that would require the presence of other objects and the absence of the first things that do not necessarily require the absence of other objects—for example, between satisfying the thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning and fire, light and the rising of the sun, death and beheadings, healing and taking medication, ... and the other examples that can be observed in the objects that are linked in medicine, astronomy, art, and skill. The interrelationship between the two is because of the ordinance of God who created it together, not because both are necessary and inseparable. On the contrary, [God] is able to create satiety without eating, death without beheading,


\(^{54}\)Goodman, “Did al-Gazālī,” 90; Griffel, al-Gazālī’s Philosophical, 147.
maintaining life after beheading, and so on. The philosophers rejected the possibility of [this] and considered impossible.\textsuperscript{55}

At a glance, a rebuttal of al-Gazālī above seems to defend the establishment of occasionalism about the nature. However, instead of defending Occasionalism, he emphasized the phenomenal characteristics of natural events such as the burning of fabrics after contacting with the fire and that the phenomenon can be explained by two theories, which are equally valid:

They did not have any evidence other than the observation that the combustion occurs after contacting with flame. Observation (mushāhadah) only shown the events that took place after (al-ḥuşūl ʿindahu), not because (al-uşūl bihi) [something else] and that there’s no cause (ʿillah) again in others.\textsuperscript{56}

Then, Al-Gazālī sequentially exposes both theories. The first is theory of occassionalism which argues that the only agent who creates the event scorching of the fabric is God, not the fire, whether directly or through an intermediary angel.\textsuperscript{57} The second theory explains that the object in the nature does have specific properties and causality, but in a secondary sense. The causal relationship arises because of the provision or the ordinance of God, not because its essence should be as such.\textsuperscript{58} Here, al-Gazālī did not explain which of two theories that he follows.

\textbf{Adaptation and Appropriation: Al-Gazālī’s Philosophy}

Al-Gazālī's rejection against a number of the philosophical theses in metaphysics and natural science implies that he did not object to their theses in other fields or even their approach and methodology in philosophy generally. He wanted to show the weakness of philosophical thoughts in these fields. Regarding the validity of the logic as a methodology of thinking, for example, he stressed that this science is the discipline of neutral knowledge. In his book in response to the Isma'ilis, \textit{al-Qiṣṭas al-Mustaqim}, al-Gazālī reads several verses which he patterns

\textsuperscript{55} Al-Gazālī, \textit{Tahāfut al-Falāsīfah}, 166.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 167.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 167.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 169-170.
according to figures of categorical and disjunctive syllogism.\textsuperscript{59} Through this book, al-Gazālī certainly does not mean to say that the Aristotelian and Stoic syllogism are "supported" by the verses of the Qur'an, but that, in essence, the ratio and the revelation teach the same things and come to the equal conclusion. In 	extit{Munqidz}, al-Gazālī reminds every Muslim in order not to get stuck in one of two extreme attitudes in dealing with philosophy. The first is to blindly accept to anything that is taught by the philosophers without investigating the status and level of the truth. Many people seeing the ancient Greek philosophers as great experts who unrivaled in the field of the logic or mathematics conclude that their teachings on metaphysics must have the same degree of accuracy as mathematics. According to al-Gazālī, this is the error which arises because of blind taqlid.\textsuperscript{60}

The second extreme attitude is that some believers who have strong religiosity but do not have enough base of knowledge (\textit{sādiq jābil}) see philosophy in terms of its teachings. They perceive that all the ideas of the philosophers are wrong, even that has proved demonstratively by logic. They are in the sarcastic phrase of al-Gazālī. They thought that the religion of Islam is based on stupidity. They do not understand that such an attitude will endanger Islamic thought. It may incite a view that Islam is indeed a religion that against science or wisdom.\textsuperscript{61}

For al-Gazālī, it seems that rejecting the demonstrability of philosophical theses is one thing; while accepting and utilizing these theses is something else. In \textit{Tabāfut}, al-Gazālī emphasizes that philosophers are unable to prove "the existence of God," or that "God is one."\textsuperscript{62} But, of course it does not mean that al-Gazālī do not believe in the existence of God or monotheism.


\textsuperscript{60}Al-Gazālī, \textit{al-Munqīdth min al-Ḍalāl}, 21.

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., 21-22.

\textsuperscript{62}Al-Gazālī, \textit{Tabāfut al-Falāsīfah }, vol.4 & 5.
Here, he just tries to show that the evidences advanced by Muslim philosophers do not reach demonstrative level. However, the thought that is not demonstrative is not necessarily wrong and can be utilized in other respects.

Al-Gazālī’s attitude against the psychology of Ibn Sīnā is an interesting example. In Tahāfut, al-Gazālī provides a special chapter to criticize the psychology in chapters 18 and 19. However, it does not prevent him from utilizing the teachings of Ibn Sīnā to explain his own thoughts. This is what he did, for example, in Iḥya’ ’Ulūm al-Dīn. This book is a manual on the practice of Sufism. In it, al-Gazālī invites Muslims to practice the teachings of the Shari’ah (mu’āmalah) in the various fields. With this practice, it is expected they will get "enlightenment" or mukāshafah, the highest knowledge in epistemological hierarchy of the sufis. However, when trying to explain the psychological foundation of this theory in Book XX of Iḥya’, he borrowed the theory of Ibn Sīnā about the psychology. In Mishkāt al-Anwār, he modifies the terminology preface when he wrote that human perception (rūḥ) is divided into five: (a) the spirit of sense (al-rūḥ al-ḥissi), (b) the spirit of imaginative (al-rūḥ al-khayālī), (c) intellectual spirit (al-rūḥ al-’aqlī), (d) discursive spirit (al-rūḥal-Fikrī), and the spirit of the holy Prophet (al-rūḥal-Qudsi al-Nabawī).

Al-Gazālī’s rejection to the theory of causality does not imply that he believes of extreme occasionalism or that he does not believe in the theory of causality. In Iḥya, al-Gazālī warned Muslims:

---


If you expected God to make you full without bread, or making bread moves to you, or order his angels to chew for you and watched it move to your stomach—it will only show the folly of his actions.  

He also utilizes the hierarchy of being introduced by Ibn Sīnā to explain the meaning of a text of five levels of existence in Faysal al-Taqriqa. In this book, al-Ghazali explained that form which designated by a word in the text of Qur’ān or Hadith has five possible existence: (a) The realization of essential (al-wujūd al-dbâh), (b) a form of sensory (al-wujūd al-ḥissâ), (c) the form of imaginative (al-wujūd al-ḥayâl), (d) intellectual form (al-wujūd al-ʾaqlî), and (e) the metaphorical form (al-wujūd al-shibhî). This al-Gazâlî’s theory, as shown by Griffel, apparently levied from Ibn Sīnā’s theory about the inner senses (al-Hawass al-Batîna). The conservative clerics attacked him in Nishapur when he was teaching at Nizamiyya. As a result, readers of al-Gazâlî who switched from Tahâfut to his other works will get the impression that the book is called first; he was doing skeptical games against philosophy.

Tahâfut is an influential book in the scientific tradition of Islam in subsequent periods. However, its impact should not be overstated. The book indeed refutes many aspects of philosophical view by Muslim philosophers and sparks other writings. Ironically, the main critics of Tahâfut are students or the heirs of al-Gazâlî's own thoughts. The earliest was Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî, eccentric Ash’arī theologian of the 12th century. In a series of public debate which he did in Iran, openly he discredited of Tahâfut and considered methodologically weak.

---

66 Al-Gazâlî, Ibyâ’, 4: 249; quoted by Ormsby, Ghazâlî, 80.
70 Regarding the earliest followers of al-Gazâlî, especially in Iran, see Griffel, al-Gazâlî’s Philosophical, 61-95.
In the West, a major critic of al-Gazālī is Ibn Rushd. He wrote *Tabāfsut al-Tabāfsut* to prove that the works of al-Gazālī was "largely has not reached yet the level of demonstrative [as he claims]." Finally, in the 15th century, Khojazâdeh peeled the weaknesses of al-Gazālī's approach in responding to the teachings of the philosophy.

The Recent studies about the development of the philosophy study and logic in the Islamic world after the 5th century/11th show that the assumptions and the generalizations (that *Tabāfsut* destroys philosophy in Islam) is exaggeration. According to Ansary, *Tabāfsut* should be regarded as a representation of the emergence of Nominalist criticism against Aristotelian philosophy. Nominalism is usually understood as a school of thought which rejects the existence of abstract

---

72Here may be so important to emphasize that the terms of the genealogy of thought, Ibn Rushd was a disciple or the followers of al-Gazālī. He was a disciple of Abū Ja’far al-Turjālī and Abū Bakr Ibn al-’Arabī. The last, we know, direct disciple of Dānishmand. Debt of gratitude Ibn Rushd to al-Gazālī is bigger than which we assume. He among other things wrote an overview of the major works of al-Gazālī about the origin of fiqh, *al-Mustaṣfā*. His theory about the text interpretation method is also levied from the view of al-Ghazālī. See Frank Griffel, “The Relationship between Averroes and al-Gazālī as it presents itself in Averroes” Early Writings, especially in his Commentary on al-Gazālī’s *al-Mustaṣfā*,” in *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism and Christianity*, ed. John Inglis (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2002), 51–63.


objects or the universal in metaphysics. Through *Tabāfut*, al-Gazālī challenges the Peripatetic philosopher to prove their theses elegantly. He challenges them not to be dogmatic in scientific discourse because science is always open to critics.

**Conclusion**

This article has provided some critical analyses about al-Gazālī's views on philosophy and the role of *Tabāfut al-Falasifa* in it. Al-Gazālī wrote *Tabāfut* for contestation against the superiority claims of philosophy epistemological superiority claims. In the 20 chapters of this book, he rejected the claim that the conclusions of the classical philosophers (in particular themes in the field of metaphysics and natural science) had achieved the status of a demonstrative argument. Thereby, al-Gazālī's criticism against philosophers is simply directed at their conclusions. He was not questioning the validity of the logic of the methodology of philosophical reasoning. In contrast, al-Gazālī accepts the logic of methodology and demonstrative criteria (*burhan/apodeixis*) as a tool to measure the scientific truth and takes advantage of this methodology to sue the philosophical conclusions. Thus, al-Gazālī is fully rationalist in his thought.

The role of al-Gazālī in the development of philosophy in Islam should not be seen as a destructive. The criticism of al-Gazālī in *Tabāfut* can not be seen as a reaction to the philosophical dogma or orthodoxy. He should be seen as a Muslim cleric who holds an important role in naturalization and adaptation of the Greek philosophical tradition into the building of Islamic thought. Al-Gazālī is an eclectic thinker and tends to be synthesis. He rejects parts of Muslim philosopher’s views that he thinks are contrary to fundamental Islamic principles while adopting and modifying other parts which are free from controversies. For example, he advocated using Aristotelian logic in jurisprudence (*usul fiqh*) and theology (*kalam*), neo-Platonic cosmology and Avicennian psychology in theology and mystical teachings. After the death of al-Gazālī, the philosophy has ceased to be a school of thought that stands alone. However, the particular aspects of his thought system are
absorbed and integrated into the system of theology or mysticism.

References


Griffel, Frank. “Al-Gazālī’s Concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into Aš’arite


_______. “New Light on the Reception of al-Gazālī’s Doctrines of the Philosophers *(Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa).*” In *In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century*. 


